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Mentale Simulation:  
Eine effektive Methode zur Förderung von zielgerichtetem Verhalten 
 
Zusammenfassung der Dissertationsschrift  
 
 Die vorliegende Dissertation umfasst drei Teile. Zwei dieser Teile wurden 
in Form eines Artikels für eine englischsprachige psychologische Fachzeitschrift 
verfasst, und ein Teil in Form eines Buchkapitels für ein englischsprachiges 
psychologisches Fachbuch. Die zwei Artikel und das Buchkapitel beschäftigen sich 
mit einer Selbstregulationsstrategie zur Förderung der Zielerreichung, genannt 
mentale Simulation. Unter mentaler Simulation versteht man das Durchführen 
einer Visualisierung vor dem inneren Auge. Visualisiert werden können sowohl 
realitätsnahe, als auch fantasiereiche Inhalte, und die Visualisierung kann sich mit 
Dingen in der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart oder Zukunft beschäftigen. Untersucht 
wurden im Speziellen die zugrundeliegenden vermittelnden Mechanismen 
(kognitive Prozesse) einer mentalen Simulation. Artikel 1 befasst sich mit der 
Frage der Mediatoren der Förderung von zielgerichtem gesundheitsbezogenen 
Verhalten und diskutiert die Rolle der Schwierigkeit der gesetzten 
Gesundheitsziele. Artikel 2 vergleicht in 4 Studien die Selbstregulationsstrategie 
der mentalen Simulation mit der Strategie der Vorsatzbildung. Dabei werden 
Unterschiede in Bezug auf die durch Anwendung der beiden Strategien 
hervorgerufenen mindsets untersucht und das Aktivierungsniveau von in ihnen 
enthaltenen mentalen Konstrukten (zielfördernde Situationen und zielfördernde 
Verhaltensweisen) verglichen. Im dritten Teil dieser Dissertationsschrift, dem 
Buchkapitel, werden die gefundenen Unterschiede bezüglich zugrundeliegender 
vermittelnder Mechanismen von mentaler Simulation und Vorsatzbildung 
aufgezeigt und vor dem Hintergrund des Modells der Aktionsphasen diskutiert und 
mit neuer Forschung aus dem Bereich der Vorsatzbildung in Verbindung gesetzt.  
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Artikel 1: Mentales Simulieren und das Erreichen von Gesundheitszielen: 
Der Einfluss von Zielschwierigkeit  
(Mental simulation and the achievement of health goals: The role of goal 
difficulty) 
 
 Die moderne psychologische Forschung im Bereich Motivation befasst sich 
mit verschiedenen Strategien zur Förderung von zielgerichtetem Verhalten. Eine 
dieser Strategien ist mentale Simulation. Darunter versteht man ein mentales 
Vorstellen von realen oder hypothetischen Ereignissen. Im Allgemeinen wird 
zwischen zwei Arten von mentaler Simulation unterschieden: Simulation des 
erwünschten Ergebnisses (Ergebnissimulation) und Simulation des Prozesses der 
Zielerreichung (Prozesssimulation). Bisherige Forschung hat gezeigt, dass sich 
das Durchführen einer mentalen Simulation – vor allem in Form von Simulation 
des Zielerreichungsprozesses - positiv auf die Zielerreichung auswirkt. Mentale 
Simulationen scheinen die Motivation zu erhöhen, Planungsschritte in Gang zu 
bringen, und beim Regulieren von Emotionen zu helfen.  
In diesem Teil der vorliegenden Dissertation wurde gezeigt, dass mentale 
Simulation die Erreichung von gesundheitsbezogenen Zielen fördert. 
Universitätsstuden-ten wurden gebeten, sich ein leichtes oder schwieriges 
Gesundheitsziel (Beispiele leichter und schwieriger Gesundheitsziele wurden zur 
Verfügung gestellt) auszusuchen. Im Anschluss daran wurden die 
Versuchsteilnehmer entweder gebeten, sich das erwünschte Ergebnis 
(Ergebnisssimulation) oder den Prozess der Zielerreichung (Prozesssimulation) 
vorzustellen, oder sie wurden einer Kontrollbedingung zugeteilt. 
Versuchsteilnehmer in der Ergebnissimulationsbedingung stellten sich 
beispielsweise vor, dass sie 3 mal pro Woche Sport machen, während sich 
Versuchsteilnehmer in der Prozesssimulationsbedingung vorstellten, wie sie 
planen, 3 mal pro Woche Sport zu machen. Nach der Manipulation der drei 
Versuchsbedingungen füllten die Versuchsteilnehmer einen Fragebogen aus, der 
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potentielle Mediatoren (Motivation, Planung, Self-efficacy, positive und negative 
Emotionen) erfasste. Alle Versuchsteilnehmer wurden dann gebeten, während 
dem Zeitraum von einer Woche an ihren Zielen zu arbeiten und jeden Tag 
aufzuschreiben, was sie für ihr Ziel getan haben. Nach einer Woche kehrten alle 
Versuchsteilnehmer ins Labor zurück, um ihre Notizen abzugeben. Die Ergebnisse 
ziegten, dass beide Arten der mentalen Simulation die Zielerreichung im Vergleich 
zur Kontrollgruppe erhöhten. Das Durchführen einer mentalen Simulation erwies 
sich dabei als besonders hilfreich bei schwierigen Gesundheitszielen. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigten auch, dass der positive Effekt der mentalen Simulation auf die 
Erreichung schwieriger Gesundheitsziele durch ein erhöhtes Ausmaß an 
Motivation hervorgerufen wurde.  
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Artikel 2: Mentale Simulation und Vorsatzbildung: Initiieren von 
unterschiedlichen Mindsets  
(Mental simulation and implementation intentions: Initiating different mind-sets) 
 
Wenn Menschen sich ein Ziel setzen, dann existieren meistens mehrere 
mögliche Wege zu diesem Ziel. Je nach Art des Zieles, ob mehr oder weniger 
komplex, existieren auch mehrere mögliche Strategien, die bei der Zielerreichung 
helfen können. Artikel 2 der vorliegenden Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der 
Erforschung der zugrundeliegen-den vermittelnden Mechanismen zweier solcher 
Selbstregulationsstrategien der Förderung von zielgerichtetem Verhalten, genannt 
mentale Simulation und Vorsatzbildung. Während man sich beim Durchführen 
einer mentalen Simulation den Zielerreichungsprozess und das Ziel selbst vor 
dem inneren Auge vorstellt, entscheidet man bei der Vorsatzbildung, wann, wie, 
und wo man ein bestimmtes Zielverhalten ausführen möchte. Wenn man 
beispielsweise vorhat, regelmäßig Sport zu treiben, dann könnte man den 
folgenden Vorsatz fassen: Wenn ich Dienstag abend (wann) bei mir um die Ecke 
im Fitnessstudio bin (wo), dann trainiere ich konzentriert für 1,5 Stunden (wie). 
Die der Vorsatzbildung zugrundeliegenden vermittelnden Mechanismen wurden in 
bisheriger Forschung detailliert erforscht und erklärt. Die zugrundeliegenden 
vermittelnden Mechanismen der mentalen Simulation dagegen wurden bislang 
nur ansatzweise untersucht. In diesem Artikel werden 4 Studien vorgestellt, die 
sich mit dieser Frage beschäftigen und im besonderen Unterschiede zwischen 
mentaler Simulation und Vorsatzbildung hinsichtlich zugrundeliegender mindsets 
(Studie 1 und 2) und hinsichtlich Aktivierungsniveaus von relevanten mentalen 
Konzepten (Studie 3 und 4) untersuchen. Die Studien spiegeln dabei den Aufbau 
eines Vorsatzes (Wenn...., dann...) wider, indem eine Studie die zielrelevante 
Situation im Wenn-Teil und die andere das zielbezogene Verhalten im Dann-Teil 
untersucht. Die Manipulation der mentalen Simulation und Vorsatzbildung wurde 
in allen 4 Studien ähnlich erreicht: Die Versuchsteilnehmer wurden immer 
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entweder der mentalen Simulationsbedingung oder der Vorsatzbildungsbedingung 
zugewiesen. Im ersten Fall wurden sie gebeten, sich vorzustellen, wie sie 
verschiedene Zielverhaltensweisen planen und ausführen; in der 
Vorsatzbildungsbedingung wurden sie gebeten, zu den vorgegebenen Zielen zu 
spezifizieren, wann, wo, und wie sie diese realisieren würden. 
In Studie 1 und 2 konnte gezeigt werden, dass mentale Simulation und 
Vorsatzbildung unterschiedliche mindsets hervorrufen. Während das mindset in 
Verbindung mit mentaler Simulation Charakteristika eines deliberative mindset 
(open-minded Verarbeiten von Informationen) aufweist, ruft Vorsatzbildung eher 
ein implemental mindset hervor, das durch closed-minded 
Informationsverarbeitung gekennzeichnet ist. Die Studien 3 und 4 untersuchten 
Unterschiede in Aktivierungsniveaus von mentalen Konstrukten, die in einer 
mentalen Simulation und einem Vorsatz enthalten sind. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass die Vorsatzbildung zu einer höheren Aktivierung dieser mentalen Konstrukte 
im Vergleich zur mentalen Simulation führt.  
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Artikel 3: Mentale Repraesentationen und kognitive Prozesse der Wenn-
Dann-Planung  
(The Mental Representations and Cognitive Procedures of IF-THEN Planning) 
 
Das Modell der Aktionsphasen beschreibt den Prozess der Zielerreichung 
als ein sukzessives Durchlaufen von vier verschiedenen Phasen. Ein Individuum 
beginnt in der pre-decisional Phase, durchläuft dann die pre-actional und actional 
Phase und endet mit der post-actional Phase. Jeder Phase liegt dabei ein anderes 
mindset zugrunde, das bei dem Lösen der entsprechenden Aufgabe auf dem Weg 
der Zielerreichung hilft.  
Der dritte Teil dieser Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit den ersten beiden 
Phasen des Aktionsmodells und deren zugrundeliegenden mindsets und vergleicht 
die beiden im vorherigen bereits vorgestellten Selbstregulationsstrategien, 
mentale Simulation und Vorsatzbildung, hinsichtlich der ihnen zugrundeliegenden 
mindsets. Im ersten Teil des Buchkapitels werden, nach einer Revision der 
Forschung zum Aktionsphasenmodell und zu mindsets, die 4 Studien des Artikel 2 
dieser Dissertation detailliert in bezug auf die Fragestellung der unterschiedlichen 
mindsets diskutiert. Als Ergebnis dieser Befunde und der Revision bisheriger 
Forschung wird eine Erweiterung der im Aktionsphasenmodell diskutierten 
mindsets vorgeschlagen. Bislang galt, dass ein deliberative mindset nur in der 
pre-decisional Phase vorkommt, aber die in Artikel 2 dieser Dissertation 
beschriebene Forschung zeigt, dass, je nach Anwendung der Strategie, ein 
deliberative mindset auch in der pre-actional Phase beobachtet werden kann (z.B. 
beim Durchführen einer mentalen Simulation). Im Speziellen wird vorgeschlagen, 
dass ein deliberative mindset bei der Erreichung komplexer Zielen auch in der 
pre-actional Phase hilfreich sein kann, um den besten Weg zum Ziel 
herauszufinden.  
 Im letzten Teil des Buchkapitels werden Befunde hinsichtlich der 
Aktivierungsniveaus von mentalen Konstrukten in mentaler Simulation versus 
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Vosatzbildung diskutiert und mit neueren Befunden aus der 
Vorsatzbildungsforschung verglichen. Eine mentale Simulation scheint zu einer 
gleichmäßigen Aktivierung aller in ihr enthaltenen mentalen Konstrukte zu führen. 
Die Vosatzbildung dagegen führt zu einer selektiven Aktivierung der mentalen 
Konstrukte, die zielrelevant sind und im Zentrum des jeweiligen Vorsatzes 
stehen.  
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Artikel 1: Mentales Simulieren und das Erreichen von Gesundheitszielen: 
Der Einfluss von Zielschwierigkeit  
(Mental simulation and the achievement of health goals: The role of goal 
difficulty)
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Abstract 
The present study examined whether performing mental simulation fosters the 
achievement of personal health-related goals. College students were asked to 
choose either an easy or a difficult health goal. In addition, they were either 
assigned to a process simulation condition (simulating the steps to the goal), an 
outcome simulation condition (simulating the achievement of the goal), or to a 
passive control condition. Results indicated that both types of mental simulation 
enhanced the achievement of health-related goals, and proved especially effective 
at difficult goals. Given an easy goal, it did not make a difference if participants 
had performed mental simulations or not. The effect of mental simulation on the 
achievement of difficult health goals was mediated by enhanced motivation.  
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Introduction 
Health goals are more and more “en vogue” in society, be it the increasing 
run on fitness institutions, dieting centers, and health food stores, or the 
increasing number of books and magazines that inform about the newest health 
diet or body-shaping program. On the other hand, statistics indicate that the 
need of changing health behaviors in society is still enormous: 26% of American 
adults smoke, 27% of the US population is obese, and approximately 40% of 
American adults do not engage in regular physical activity (US Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2000); half of the mortality rate is attributable to 
unhealthy behavior (Maes & Van Elderen, 1998). The need and interest is there, 
however, many people fail in achieving their particular health goals. What can be 
done to help people achieve their set goals? 
Many authors of popular psychology stress the benefits of various 
cognitive strategies in order to make desired goals reality (e.g., Peale, 1982). 
Mental simulation, one of these strategies, refers to mentally imitating events, 
both real and hypothetical ones (Taylor & Schneider, 1989). Conceptually, two 
types of mental simulation can be distinguished (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 
1998). The first one focuses on the desired outcome itself and is labeled outcome 
simulation. The idea is that mentally simulating the successful achievement of the 
goal will help to bring it about. The second type of mental simulation is labeled 
process simulation. Despite the focus on the desired goal, process simulation 
suggests simulating the steps to the goal. The various activities that are 
necessary to achieve a certain outcome are envisioned and mentally elaborated. 
The aim of the present study was to extend the scope of the mental simulation 
construct by applying it to health-related goals. While research to date has 
examined the impact of mental simulation on exam performance (Pham & Taylor, 
1999), on coping with stressful events (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999), on goal-directed 
performance (Taylor & Pham, 1999), and on the establishment of congruence 
between implicit motives and explicit goals (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999), no 
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research has investigated the effects of mental simulation on the achievement of 
health-related goals. We hypothesized that participants who engaged in either 
outcome or process simulation would be more capable of achieving their health 
goals than participants who did not use mental simulation 1. 
Studies comparing process and outcome simulation yielded mixed results. 
While some studies (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Rivkin & Taylor, 1999) suggested the 
superiority of process simulation over outcome simulation, others revealed that 
both enhance goal-directed activity to the same extent (Taylor & Pham, 1999). 
Hence, as a further aim we also attempted to distinguish empirically between 
process and outcome simulation. 
How does mental simulation lead to more goal-directed activity? Mental 
simulation entails several characteristics that might enhance the link between 
thought and action. First, mental simulation augments the motivational states 
(Taylor & Pham, 1999) that might enhance actions toward the desired goals. 
Second, mental simulation facilitates planning the steps (Pham & Taylor, 1999; 
Rivkin & Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Schneider, 1989) that lead to the achievement of 
a goal. Third, it may increase perceptions of self-efficacy (Neck & Manz, 1996) 
that could yield superior performance. Fourth, mental simulation evokes 
emotional states (Neck & Manz, 1996), such as positive affect, which may 
facilitate action. Hence, a further aim of the present study was to examine 
potential mediators, including motivation, planning, self-efficacy, and affective 
states, by which mental simulation enhances the achievement of desired health 
goals.  
The major purpose of this research, however, is concerned with testing 
whether mental simulation has the same effective and beneficial outcomes on 
easy and difficult goals. Gollwitzer and Brandstätter (1997) found that forming 
implementation intentions only facilitated goal completion of difficult goals; 
whereas findings regarding easy goals revealed no differences in the completion 
rate between participants who had and who had not formed implementation 
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intentions. According to Gollwitzer and Brandstätter, the engagement in an easy 
goal seems to be more habitualized and, therefore, less affected by a facilitative 
technique. Based on this research, we predicted that the beneficial effects of 
mental simulation on goal achievement were limited to difficult goals; whereas 
mental simulation should neither increase nor diminish easy goal-directed 
activity. 
The Present Study 
Participants were first asked to specify a specific health goal that they 
wanted to achieve. Half of the participants specified a goal that was difficult to 
accomplish, while the remaining half specified a goal that was easy to accomplish. 
In the process simulation condition, participants mentally simulated themselves 
working toward the achievement of their health goal. In the outcome simulation 
condition, participants received the instruction to mentally simulate themselves 
having already achieved their health goal. In a control condition, no mental 
simulation was carried out. In the following week, participants were asked to 
employ a calendar to keep track of their behavior, which was related to their 
health goal. The content of the calendars was coded in order to obtain a score of 
the goal-accomplishment for each participant. Further, to explain possible 
differences among the experimental conditions, we also asked for potential 
mediators including motivation, planning, self-efficacy, and positive and negative 
affect.  
Method 
Participants and Experimental Design 
Eighty-eight introductory psychology students at the University of 
California, Los Angeles (UCLA) participated in partial fulfillment of a research 
experience requirement. Seven participants who were almost equally distributed 
among the experimental conditions did not turn in their calendar sheets. Thus, 
the final sample consisted of 81 participants. The age of the participants ranged 
from 18 to 33 with a mean age of 20.34. Participants were run in groups of one 
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to four. The groups were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions 
in a 3 (mental simulation: process vs. outcome vs. control) x 2 (task difficulty: 
easy vs. difficult) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure and Materials  
The experimenter introduced the study as an investigation of pursuing 
health goals. Participants were asked to specify either an easy or a difficult 
personal health goal, which they wanted to achieve during the following week. 
They were also asked to specify the exact amount of health behavior that they 
planned to achieve by exactly determining how often they wanted to engage in 
the goal-directed behavior. The following examples were provided: “In the 
coming week, I plan to exercise everyday”, “I want to drink a medium coke less 
per day in the coming week”, and “I will avoid all foods high in sugar and fat for 
the next 7 days.” After that the simulation exercises were carried out. The 
participants listened with closed eyes to the following instructions read aloud by 
the experimenter (adapted from Pham & Taylor, 1999): 
Process simulation. “Imagine the goal in the health domain that you just 
specified. Visualize yourself working toward the achievement of that goal. Picture 
yourself standing at the path that leads to your goal. Imagine how you work on 
your goal. Try to really see the path to your goal. How does it look like? Imagine 
how your life looks like on the path to your goal. What are the changes that you 
could make to it in order to get closer to your goal? How would a typical day look 
like on which you engage in your health behavior? Look at your life from your 
path. Imagine the changes that you could make in order to implement your 
health behavior into your daily life. Visualize the satisfaction you feel being in the 
middle of your process. Picture how good it feels to be on the way. Try to really 
feel how it is to be on the way. Feel how good it is. Think about your daily 
routine. Picture yourself deciding on which part of the day you could best 
implement your health behavior. Imagine such a day and visualize how you would 
implement your health behavior in it. See the path you are on. Picture exactly 
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where you stand. Picture the work you are doing to achieve your goal. See the 
single parts of the process you are in. How does it feel to work on the 
accomplishment of your goal, to work on the change of your health behavior?”  
Outcome simulation. ”Think about the goal from the health domain that 
you just specified. Visualize yourself having already achieved that goal. Picture 
yourself having worked on the goal. You have put a lot of effort into the 
achievement of your goal and have finally accomplished it. Imagine the effort you 
have made. See yourself standing at the point of success from where you look 
back on the work you did to get there. Imagine how your life is different since 
you achieved your goal. Visualize the changes that resulted from the 
accomplishment of your goal. How does it feel to have implemented a behavior 
that is good for you into your daily life? Picture your life how it is now. 
Concentrate on the feelings that you have because you do something that is 
really good for you. Visualize the satisfaction you feel at having achieved your 
goal. Picture the pride you feel, the confidence you feel in yourself, knowing that 
you were successful with your goal. Try to really feel the satisfaction with the 
accomplishment of your goal. Feel how proud and confident you are. Think about 
your daily routine. What does your day look like, now that your health behavior is 
a firm part of it? Imagine a typical day and see yourself engaging in your health 
behavior. See yourself standing at the point of success. Picture yourself thinking 
back to when you started working on your goal. How do you feel having 
successfully accomplished what you wanted? Concentrate on the energy that your 
health behavior contributes to your life. How does it feel to have more energy and 
to know that you successfully engage in a behavior that is good for you?” 
Control condition. Participants in the control group were not instructed in 
any exercise and immediately proceeded with answering the dependent 
measures. 
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Dependent Measures 
As a manipulation check, participants were asked to rate the difficulty of 
their chosen health goal on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very difficult). To 
assess the potential mediators, all participants filled out a questionnaire 
measuring motivation, planning, self-efficacy, and positive and negative affect. 
Except of the measure for positive and negative affect, all items were derived 
from Pham and Taylor (1999) and were adapted in content to the present study. 
Assessments were made on an interval scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely). Motivation was assessed through three items: “How motivated are 
you to achieve your goal?” “How motivated are you to put in effort to achieve 
your goal?”, and “How motivated are you to invest a lot for your goal?” 
(Cronbach’s alpha was .84). Planning was assessed by asking the following three 
items: “To what extent have you figured out exactly what steps you might take to 
achieve your goal?”, “To what extent do you have a plan for how you can achieve 
your goal?”, and “To what extent do you feel well prepared to achieve your goal?” 
(Cronbach’s alpha was .67). Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986) was assessed through 
asking participants “How confident are you to make the effort to achieve your 
goal?”, “How confident are you to have the ability to achieve your goal?”, and 
“How confident are you to be able to put in the energy needed to achieve your 
goal” (Cronbach’s alpha was .79). Positive and negative affect was measured with 
a slightly adapted version of the Kammann and Flett (1983) questionnaire, 
consisting of 10 four-item subscales with two statements and two items that 
consist of a specific emotional adjective (e.g. “free-and-easy”). In the present 
study only the 20 affective adjectives were included as state measures for 
positive and negative affect. Cronbach’s alphas for these two indexes were .81 
and .85, respectively. 
After the completion of the questionnaire, simulation participants were 
asked to practice the simulation exercise once a day until the follow-up one week 
later through reading the simulation script and producing the suggested images in 
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their mind with their eyes closed. Participants in all conditions received a calendar 
sheet for the following week and were asked to specify each day what they did 
about their goal on that day.  
One week later participants returned to the lab for the second session. 
They turned in their calendar sheets that indicated the amount of health behavior 
they had achieved during the last week. Participants were then thanked, 
thoroughly debriefed, and dismissed.  
Two research assistants coded the behavior reported in the calendar 
sheets. For each day, a score of the degree of the goal-accomplishment was 
given to each participant. To give just two examples: If a participant wrote that 
the goal was to exercise everyday, then 100% was scored, if he/she did actually 
exercise everyday as reported in the calendar. If the goal was to drink a bottle of 
water four times a week, and the participant drank a bottle of water just twice a 
week, a score of 50% was given. Both raters were blind to the experimental 
hypotheses as well as to the simulation condition. Agreement among raters was 
very high (r = .91); disagreement was solved by discussion. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Participants who pursued a difficult health goal rated their goal as being 
more difficult (M = 5.11) than participants who pursued an easy health goal (M = 
3.82), t(79) = 4.06, p < .001. Hence, the experimental manipulation was 
successful. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Age and gender of participants were not related to any of the main 
dependent variables. Thus, these variables were not considered further. 
Inspection of the participants’ health goals revealed that most of the goals 
described included the topic nutrition (46%), such as eating no or at least less 
sweets and dessert, eating more fruits and vegetables, drinking more water, or 
drinking less soda beverages. Thirty-five percent included the topic exercise, such 
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as use the stairs instead of the elevator, go to the gym more often, whereas 18% 
included other topics, such as smoke less or sleep more. However, since there 
was no interaction between kind of health goal and the independent variables for 
any of the dependent variables, this variable is also not considered further. 
Goal Achievement 
There were no systematic differences between process and outcome 
simulation participants in achieving their goals. Thus, following the 
recommendations of Rosenthal and Rosnow (1985), planned contrasts were 
performed, comparing the simulation conditions (the process simulation condition 
and the outcome simulation condition) and the control condition. As shown in 
Table 1, participants in the simulation conditions (M = 78.7%, SD = 17.4) 
accomplished more of their health goals than participants in the control condition 
(M = 68.0%, SD = 26.5), F(1, 76) = 4.76, p < .05, η2 = .06. Goal achievement 
did not differ dependent on goal difficulty, F(1, 76) = 1.39, p = .24, η2 = .02. 
However, there was also a significant interaction between simulation condition 
and goal difficulty, F(1, 76) = 2.85, p < .05 (one-sided), η2 = .04. Analysis of 
simple main effects revealed that simulation affected goal achievement only for 
difficult goals, t(34) = 2.68, p < .05, but not for easy goals, t(42) = 0.36, p = 
.72. Given a difficult goal, participants in the simulation conditions (M = 80.2%, 
SD = 16.3) were more successful in accomplishing their goals than participants in 
the control condition (M = 60.9%, SD = 26.7), whereas there were no differences 
between the simulation conditions (M = 77.6%, SD = 18.3) and the control 
condition (M = 75.2%, SD = 25.3) given an easy goal.  
Potential Mediators 
Table 2 shows the means of the potential mediators that were assessed in 
the present study - namely motivation, planning, self-efficacy, and positive and 
negative affect – for the simulation conditions and goal difficulty. No significant 
differences between outcome and process simulation occurred for any of the 
potential mediators. Thus, planned contrasts comparing the simulation conditions 
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to the control condition were conducted for each of the potential mediators. 
Participants in the simulation conditions (M = 6.00, SD = 0.67) were significantly 
more motivated than participants in the control condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.08), 
F(1, 77) = 18.15, p < .001, η2 = .19. Further, participants who engaged in either 
process or outcome simulation (M = 5.64, SD = 0.75) reported using more 
planning than participants in the control condition (M = 5.04, SD = 1.16), F(1, 
77) = 7.10, p < .01, η2 = .08. Regarding self-efficacy, positive and negative 
affect, the main effects of simulation condition were, in contrast, not reliable, F(1, 
77) = 0.04, p = .84, η2 = .00; F(1, 77) = 2.95, p = .09, η2 = .04; F(1, 76) = 
1.85, p = .18, η2 = .02, respectively. Regarding positive affect, there was, 
however, a significant interaction between simulation condition and positive 
affect, F(1, 77) = 5.16, p < .05, η2 = .06. Whereas there were no differences 
given an easy goal, t(42) = 0.40, p = .69, simulation participants felt better (M = 
5.00, SD = 0.71) than control participants (M = 4.23, SD = 0.98) given a difficult 
goal, t(35) = 2.75, p < 01. 
Mediational Analysis 
As documented, goal achievement was not differently affected by mental 
simulation given an easy goal, whereas given a difficult task, relative to the 
control condition, process and outcome simulation alike yielded a higher rate in 
goal achievement. Thus, we restricted our tests for mediators on the difficult 
tasks. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), three conditions must be met in 
order to establish mediation. First, the independent variable must be significantly 
associated with the dependent variable. Second, the independent variable must 
be significantly associated with the mediator. Third, in a multiple regression, if 
both the independent variable and the mediator are used to predict the 
dependent variable, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable must be substantially lowered (compared to regression 1), whereas the 
mediator must be still significantly associated with the dependent variable. 
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First, simulation condition (coded by 0 = control condition, 1 = simulation 
condition) was significantly associated with goal achievement, β = .42, t(34) = 
2.68, p < .02. Second, simulation was significantly associated with motivation, β 
= .46, t(34) = 3.05, p < .01, and positive affect, β = .42, t(35) = 2.75, p < .01. 
In contrast, simulation was not significantly associated with planning, self-
efficacy, and negative affect (note that this analysis is restricted to the difficult 
task conditions). Hence, the second condition was only met for motivation and 
positive affect. Finally, both simulation and motivation were used as predictors for 
goal-accomplishment. The overall regression was significant, R² = .29, F(2, 33) = 
6.75, p < .01. The regression weight for motivation was significant, β = .38, t(33) 
= 2.32, p < .03, whereas the regression weight for simulation was substantially 
lowered and was no longer significant, β = .25, t(33) = 1.51, p = .14. Thus, 
mediation was shown for motivation. However, since β has not been reduced to 
zero, only partial mediation has been shown. In contrast, there was no mediation 
for positive affect. The overall regression was significant, R² = .20, F(2, 33) = 
4.12, p < .05. However, the regression weight for simulation was still significant, 
β = .35, t(33) = 2.11, p < .05, whereas the regression weight for the mediator, 
positive affect, was not significant, β = .17, t(33) = 1.02, p = .32. 
Discussion 
Many popular psychologists suggest the benefits of imaginative 
concentration on desired goals in order to make them reality (e.g., Peale, 1982). 
Although the scientific credibility of such advice is often doubted, the results of 
the present study support the contention that performing mental simulation 
increases the rate of health goal-directed activity. Participants who either 
engaged in process or outcome simulation were more successful in achieving their 
personal goals, as reported in the calendars, than participants who did not did 
engage in any simulation exercise. In line with these results, previous studies 
have already shown that mental imagery is an effective motor performance 
enhancement technique (Ryan & Simons, 1981, 1982). Further, the employment 
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of mental imagery has positive effects on employee cognitions, behaviors, and 
affects (Neck & Manz, 1996). Research has also revealed that mental simulation 
improved exam performance (Pham & Taylor, 1999), had beneficial effects on 
coping strategies (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999), and enhanced the quality of written 
essays (Taylor & Pham, 1999). In sum, it seems that the suggestion of many 
popular psychologists regarding the benefits of mentally imagining future events 
receives empirical support. 
However, the present study revealed that the benefits of mental 
simulation on goal-directed activity were limited to goals that were difficult to 
accomplish. Participants who engaged in either process or outcome simulation 
were more successful in achieving their goals than participants of the control 
condition. In contrast, given an easy task, mental simulation did not enhance goal 
achievement. This finding ties in with the research by Gollwitzer and Brandstätter 
(1997) who showed that specifying implementation intentions affected only 
difficult goals, whereas there were no benefits of implementation intentions with 
easy goals. Inasmuch as it is more economical to abstain from imagining future 
events, mental simulation is not to be recommended in terms of an easy goal 
(mental simulation does not harm goal achievement, though). 
Health goals often lack motivation to begin with (e.g. Gollwitzer & 
Oettingen, 1998), mostly due to the low incentives that accompany them (e.g., 
planning to go on a low fat diet does not seem very attractive). Furthermore, 
there are many compromising distractions and temptations (e.g., being invited to 
a dinner with friends while being on a diet) that have to be overcome. Not 
surprisingly, goals that are made with good intentions often end after a short 
period of trials, because people fail to act on them (Orbell & Sheeran, 1998). 
Accordingly, in the present study, mental simulation enhanced the achievement 
of the personal health goals by facilitating self-reported motivation, that is, the 
relation between mental simulation and goal-achievement was partially mediated 
by motivational states. There often seems to be a gap between people’s 
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intentions and their goal-directed activity. Mental simulation may help to close 
the gap between intentions and goal-directed action toward healthy behavior.  
Limitations and Future Research 
In the present study, there were no significant differences between the 
outcome and process simulation conditions for any of the dependent variables. 
One (unsatisfactory) explanation for this finding could be that the distinction 
between these two concepts is rather vague. For instance, how can one imagine a 
process without thinking about the outcome that the process is supposed to bring 
about? Accordingly, there was also some overlapping content in the process and 
outcome simulation instructions. Moreover, the control group did not engage in 
any exercise. Thus, it is conceivable that asking participants to engage in any 
goal-relevant exercise (rather than asking to engage in mental simulations per 
se) may lead to increased goal achievement. The instructions and the 
experimental procedure were adapted (and only slightly changed) from studies by 
Taylor and colleagues (Pham & Taylor, 1998; Rivkin & Taylor, 1999; Taylor & 
Pham, 1999; Taylor et al., 1998). Inasmuch as the main aim of the present study 
was to show that the effects of mental simulation on goal achievement are 
moderated by the difficulty of the goal, we closely employed their inductions. 
Nevertheless, future research is needed that provide a greater conceptual and 
operational distinction between the concepts of process and outcome simulation. 
It should be also noted, the time frame of the present study was quite 
short. As such, it was not possible to investigate long-term effects of mentally 
rehearsing a health-related goal. Mental simulation seems to be a promising 
technique for the implementation of health goals. However, a long-term 
investigation is needed to determine the lasting effects of mental simulation on 
health behaviors. It might well be that participants returned to their former 
(undesired) habits soon after participation in the study. It would also be valuable 
to investigate the effects of mental simulation on health behaviors among other 
populations than College students, such as heavy smokers or people who are 
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overweight, when goal-achievement is suggested from an outside source (e.g., a 
doctor prescribes a diet), and, thus, the goals to achieve are not self-concordant. 
Self-concordance refers to the extent to which an individual pursues a goal out of 
true personal interest as opposed to external or internal pressure (Sheldon & 
Elliot, 1998, 1999; Sheldon & Kasser, 1998) and is said to further goal 
achievement. Koestner and colleagues (Koestner, Lekes, Powers, & Chicoine, 
2002) enhanced the level of self-concordance with a cognitive technique by 
asking participants to identify meaningful reasons why they pursued their goals, 
but they were not able to replicate this result in further studies. Inasmuch as 
mental simulations enhance the congruence between implicit motives and explicit 
goals (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999), performing mental simulations may be a 
more fruitful technique to influence self-concordance levels. Hence, future 
research on mental simulation might still be a promising endeavor. 
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Footnote 
1 The concept of mental simulation needs to be distinguished from the 
concept of positive fantasies (e.g., Oettingen & Mayer, 2002) and Kuhl’s 
concept of state orientation (e.g., Kuhl, 1994). Positive fantasies involve 
the positivity of thoughts and images about the future. State orientated 
individuals are hesitating and ruminating. Both led to a failure of 
enactment of intentions. In contrast, mental simulations foster goal 
initiation.  
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Table 1 
Means for Goal Achievement as a Function of Simulation Condition and Goal 
Difficulty 
  Goal Difficulty 
Simulation Condition  Difficult Easy 
Process  84.2 77.6 
Outcome  78.1 75.9 
Control  61.4 77.5 
 
Note. Ratings were made on a scale from 0 to 100%. 
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Table 2  
Mean Ratings of Potential Mediators as a Function of Simulation Condition and 
Goal Difficulty 
  Simulation Condition 
Potential Mediators Goal Difficulty Process Outcome Control 
Motivation 
Easy 
Difficult 
6.02 
5.90 
5.79 
6.36 
5.27 
5.02 
Planning 
Easy 
Difficult 
6.00 
5.67 
5.60 
5.44 
5.00 
4.86 
Self-efficacy 
Easy 
Difficult 
5.86 
5.93 
5.96 
6.05 
6.09 
5.76 
Positive affect 
Easy 
Difficult 
4.94 
5.22 
5.03 
4.93 
5.11 
4.20 
Negative affect 
Easy 
Difficult 
2.24 
1.57 
2.20 
2.10 
2.45 
2.33 
 
Note. The scale for all variables was from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
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Artikel 2: Mentale Simulation und Vorsatzbildung: Initiieren von 
unterschiedlichen Mindsets  
(Mental simulation and implementation intentions: Initiating different mind-sets) 
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Abstract 
Mental simulations and implementation intentions are two self-regulation 
techniques that further successful goal attainment. The present research 
examined whether the two mindsets associated with the two techniques differed 
regarding processing of information. The first two studies indicated that mental 
simulation induces a mindset associated with more open-minded processing of 
information, while implementation intentions induce a mindset associated with 
more closed-minded processing of information. The final two studies investigated 
activation levels of mental representations of mental simulation and 
implementation intention via a lexical decision task. Forming implementation 
intentions was found to result in heightened activation of both situational cues 
and behavioral responses compared to mental simulation. The implications of 
these findings are discussed on the basis of the model of action phases.  
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Introduction 
A popular saying states that all roads lead to Rome. A saying that can well 
be applied to our everyday life, in which we usually have not only many different 
goals, but also many different roads to these goals. In the present research, we 
introduce four studies that compare the cognitive functioning of two distinct self-
regulation techniques: mental simulation and implementation intentions. It is 
postulated that different mindsets are induced by them; one mindset facilitating 
“taking only one road to Rome” and the other one facilitating “taking several 
roads to Rome.”  
Imagine that you adopted the goal to lead a healthy lifestyle. There are 
many different ways to achieve such a higher-level goal. Some people may focus 
on exercising regularly as their best path to achieving this goal (taking only one 
specific road to Rome), others may have different approaches (taking various 
roads to Rome) and, depending on mood and opportunities, may choose the one 
or other approach, such as one day deciding to eat very healthy meals, and some 
other day preferring to accompany a colleague to the gym. Both approaches 
(focusing on one vs. focusing on several pathways) can be equally successful at 
goal attainment.  
Mental Simulations  
A great deal of empirical research suggests that mental simulations – a 
self-regulation technique - have beneficial effects on goal attainment. Taylor and 
Schneider (1989) define mental simulations as “imitative mental representations 
of some event or a series of events”. The imagined events can both be real or 
hypothetical and the content of a mental simulation can range from wishful 
unrealistic fantasies about the future, over the rehearsal of likely future events to 
the going-over past events. Imagine again that your goal was to lead a healthy 
lifestyle. You might first mentally simulate how you exercise everyday and eat 
only healthy fruits and vegetables for lunch and dinner (a rather unrealistic 
fantasy), but then you start imagining that you go running twice a week and have 
 
 35 
a good share of fruits or vegetables at least once a day (a more likely future 
scenario). The effects of mental simulation have been found to promote the 
achievement of many different goals including performance goals, such as 
studying for an exam (Pham & Taylor, 1999) and preparing a presentation (Taylor 
& Pham, 1999), health-related goals (Greitemeyer & Würz, 2006), and goals 
related to coping with stressful events (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999). Furthermore, 
mental simulation has been shown to help establish congruence between implicit 
motives and explicit goals (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999), to increase assessed 
likelihoods of simulated events (e.g., Gregory, Cialdini, and Carpenter, 1982), to 
increase behavioral intentions towards advertised products (Escalas & Luce, 2003, 
2004), and to motivate consumption behavior (Phillips, & Baumgartner, 2002).  
Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, and Armor (1998) distinguish between two types of 
mental simulation that are especially relevant for self-regulation regarding goal-
achievement: process vs. outcome simulation. In a process simulation, the step-
by-step process of reaching a goal is imagined, whereas an outcome simulation 
focuses on the imagination of the desired outcome itself. To achieve the goal of 
leading a healthy lifestyle, a person in a process simulation would imagine the 
possible different steps that can lead to that goal and how to plan them, whereas 
in an outcome simulation the person would indulge in seeing himself or herself 
actually already leading a healthy lifestyle. Several studies have demonstrated 
that a process-focused simulation is more effective in changing behavior and 
promote performance than an outcome-focused simulation (Oettingen & Mayer, 
2002; Pham & Taylor, 1999). For example, Pham and Taylor (1999) conducted a 
study comparing process and outcome simulation as means to enhance studying 
for an exam. One week before an actual exam, participants were either asked to 
visualize themselves studying for an exam in a way that would lead to their 
obtaining a grade ‘A’ (process simulation) or to visualize themselves achieving a 
grade ‘A’ on the exam (outcome simulation). Process simulation participants were 
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shown to have spent more time for the exam and to have obtained significantly 
higher grades than outcome simulation participants.  
Why do process-focused mental simulations benefit goal achievement? 
Thus far, only one psychological process was identified that explicates the 
effectiveness of process-focused mental simulation: planning. While mental 
simulations seem to enhance motivation for the achievement of a goal 
(Greitemeyer & Würz, in press; Taylor & Pham, 1999), to further self-efficacy 
towards being able to take the necessary actions to achieve a certain goal (Neck 
& Manz, 1996), and to help regulate emotional reactions (Pham & Taylor, 1999), 
only planning (Escalas & Luce, 2003, 2004; Rivkin & Taylor, 1999) was found to 
mediate the effects of mental simulation on the achievement of desired 
outcomes.  Results from the consumer research domain, for example, 
demonstrate that process focused advertisements can facilitate behavioral 
intentions through the encouragement of formation of action plans (Escalas & 
Luce, 2003, 2004). Thus, process focused (‘step-by-step’) mental simulations 
seem to effect goal-achievement through action plan formation.  
Implementation Intentions  
In addition to mental simulation, there are other self-regulation techniques 
that lead to successful goal attainment, namely implementation intentions. 
Conceptually different from mental simulations, implementation intentions specify 
the when, where, and how of a goal-directed action and have the form of “If 
situation X is encountered, then I will perform the goal-directed response Y”. 
Forming an implementation intention leads to commitment to perform the 
specified goal-directed response once the critical situation is encountered. 
Gollwitzer (1993, 1996, 1999) distinguishes implementation intentions from goal 
intentions, which specify an endpoint and have the form of “I intend to reach Z”. 
Implementation intentions specify the situational context in which a goal-directed 
behavior will be enacted, as well as the goal-directed response itself, while goal 
intentions only specify what one wants to achieve. As such, implementation 
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intentions can be seen as well-elaborated action plans in the service of goal 
intentions that maintain how a goal will be attained. Implementation intentions 
have been shown to increase goal-attainment rates of health goals, such as 
eating healthy foods (Verplanken & Faes, 1999), attending cervical cancer 
screening (Sheeran & Orbell, 2000), performing breast self-examinations (Orbell, 
Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997), or engaging in physical exercise (Milne, Orbell, & 
Sheeran, 2002), but also to help prevent ego-depletion (Webb & Sheeran, 2003), 
to help control unwanted prejudicial responses (e.g., Achtziger, Halller, & 
Gollwitzer, under review), and to promote behavior change (e.g., Bamberg, 
2000). Results from two meta-analyses suggest that forming implementation 
intentions has a medium-to-large effect (ranging from d = .54 to d = .65) on 
successful progress at goals (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, in press; Koestner et al., 
2002).  
Why do implementation intentions facilitate goal attainment? Gollwitzer et 
al. (2005) suggest two psychological processes that relate to both the anticipated 
situation (the if-component of an implementation intention) and the goal-directed 
response (the then-component of an implementation intention). The first 
psychological process postulates that specifying implementation intentions 
involves choosing among various possible situations the one that seems most 
suitable and ripe for action (anticipated situation) leading to a heightened 
activation of the mental representation of the situation which then becomes more 
accessible. In fact, several studies demonstrated that the heightened accessibility 
facilitates attention to, and detection and recall of critical situational cues (Aarts, 
Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Gollwitzer, Bayer, Steller, & Bargh, 2002; 
Seehausen, Bayer, & Gollwitzer, 1994; Steller, 1992). For example, Aarts et al. 
(1999) observed faster lexical decision times for words that described situational 
cues specified in implementation intentions. Implementation intention effects 
were mediated by faster lexical decision times to these critical words. Faude 
(2006) further demonstrated that the formation of implementation intentions not 
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only enhances the accessibility of the anticipated situation, but also of the goal-
directed response, observing faster response latencies for behavior-words after 
implementation intention formation.   
The second postulated psychological process states that forming an 
implementation intention creates a mental link between the anticipated situation 
and the specified response. For instance, a possible link in the service of the goal 
intention to lead a healthy lifestyle would link a goal-directed response (e.g., 
exercising regularly) to a suitable situational context (e.g., at the gym). This link 
between the anticipated situation, the if-component, and the specified response, 
the then-component, leads to the specified response being initiated immediately 
(tested by means of response latencies and by the temporal proximity of actual 
performance to the time of performance specified in the implementation 
intention; e.g., Brandstätter, Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer & 
Brandstätter, 1997, Study 3; Oettingen, Hönig, & Gollwitzer, 2000), without 
conscious intent (Bayer, Moskowitz, & Gollwitzer, 2004; Sheeran, Webb, & 
Gollwitzer, 2005), and efficiently (tested by means of variation of cognitive load; 
e.g., Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001, Studies 3 and 4; Lengfelder & 
Gollwitzer, 2001) once the critical situation is encountered. Thus, action control 
through formation of implementation intentions shows features of automaticity 
(Bargh, 1992, 1994). For example, Brandstätter et al. (2001, Studies 3 and 4) 
had participants either form the goal intention to press a button as fast as 
possible if numbers appear on the computer screen, but not if letters were 
presented or form the implementation intention to press a button particularly fast 
if the number three appeared. A substantial increase in speed of responding to 
the number three could be demonstrated for implementation intentions compared 
to the goal intention group. Another study (Gollwitzer, Bayer, Steller, & Bargh, 
2002), using a dichotic-listening paradigm, demonstrated that implementation 
intention participants’ focused attention was highly interrupted by words that 
described the anticipated critical situation while no such effect appeared for goal 
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intention participants. The role of the mental link between an anticipated situation 
and a specified response on action control was investigated in a study by Webb 
and Sheeran (2006). Participants were asked to either form the implementation 
intention to press a key especially quickly if they saw the non-word “avenda” or 
to try to react as quickly as possible by familiarizing themselves with the non-
word “avenda”. A lexical decision task was then performed that contained the 
subliminal presentation of a prime word. Results indicated that implementation 
intention participants showed faster lexical decision times to the word describing 
the critical situational cue and to the word describing the specified response when 
they were preceded by the subliminally primed cue word compared to control 
participants but there was no difference between the groups when those words 
were preceded by neutral primes. In sum, the processes underlying the beneficial 
effects of implementation intentions on goal-achievement are well documented. 
Mindsets and the Model of Action Phases 
The model of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991; 
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) construes goal pursuit in terms of four different 
consecutive action phases: the predecisional phase, the preactional phase, the 
actional phase, and the postactional phase. In every phase, individuals have to 
solve a different task. In the first, predecisional phase, they have to make the 
best possible choice between different wishes they entertain, because people 
cannot act on all of their wishes at once. After giving one of the wishes the 
highest preference, individuals are ready to make a commitment to realize this 
wish (i.e., form a goal intention), and thus move on to the next phase. The main 
task in the preactional phase is to plan the implementation of the chosen goal. 
Individuals in this phase address questions of when and where to start acting, 
how to act, and how long to act. The subsequent actional phase is marked by 
action initiation, where individuals finally engage in goal-directed activities to 
achieve their wanted outcome. Finally, in the postactional phase, individuals have 
to solve the final task of evaluating the success of goal-attainment.  
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The model of action phases implies that undertaking the four distinct tasks 
described above activate congruent mindset (i.e., phase-typical cognitive 
procedures that benefit successful task completion (Gollwitzer, 1990). So far, a 
body of research has explored the cognitive features of deliberative and 
implemental mindsets; that is, differences in cognitive processes when an 
individual is choosing a goal as compared to planning the attainment of a goal.  
Research on information processing suggests that there are differences 
between deliberative and implemental mindsets regarding the way individuals 
process information. Specifically, individuals in a deliberative mindset analyze 
information more impartially, while individuals in an implemental mind-set tend 
to analyze information in a more partial way (Amor & Taylor, 2003; Gagne & 
Lydon, 2001; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Further, 
several studies have demonstrated that individuals in a deliberative mindset, as 
they have to make a goal decision, should be particularly open to any available 
information that might help them with the decision-making process (referred to 
as “general open-mindedness to information”). Because it is initially unclear 
which pieces of information are particularly relevant to the decision to be made, it 
is beneficial to approach information with a general open-mindedness. In 
contrast, individuals in an implemental mindset process information more 
selectively, focusing on goal-relevant stimuli, while ignoring goal-irrelevant 
stimuli. As a result, a deliberative mindset is associated with open-mindedness to 
information and an implemental mindset with more closed-minded processing of 
information.  
The suggested differences in open-mindedness between deliberative and 
implemental mindsets have recently been investigated by Fujita, Gollwitzer, and 
Oettingen (2007). In three studies, participants in deliberative and implemental 
mindsets had to perform a computerized concentration test. Randomly during the 
test, participants were presented with semantically unrelated incidental words 
(e.g., bone, every, flag, always). After working on a questionnaire ostensibly 
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unrelated to the tasks, participants were asked to perform a surprise 
computerized recognition memory test, containing the initially presented 
incidental words. In all three experiments, participants in a deliberative mindset 
demonstrated superior recognition memory compared to participants in an 
implemental mindset. These results provide evidence that deliberative mindsets 
are marked by more open-minded processing of information, whereas 
implemental mindsets are characterized by more closed-minded processing. 
How do these differences in processing of information of deliberative 
versus implemental mindsets apply to mental simulation and implementation 
intentions?  
We postulate that performing mental simulations activates a deliberative 
mindset associated with more open-minded processing of information. Empirical 
support for this assumption is provided by research on hindsight bias and 
counterfactual priming, which suggests that inducing a mental simulation mindset 
results in generating and considering additional alternatives (Hirt & Markmann, 
1995; Hirt, Kardes & Markmann, 2004; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1982). On the 
other hand, several studies have demonstrated that forming implementation 
intentions tunes individuals’ thoughts into the when, where, and how of goal 
implementation, a feature described in an implemental mindset (Fujita, 
Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2007; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 
1995). Further, deliberative mindsets are associated with greater openness to 
different sources and types of information (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2007), 
whereas an implemental mindset is associated with filtering of information and 
selective processing of stimuli (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990; Kuhl, 1984).  
The present studies 
The present studies were designed to test whether mental simulations 
indeed lead to a mindset associated with a more open-minded processing of 
information, whereas implementation intentions lead to a mindset that involves a 
more closed-minded processing of information. A second aim was to compare 
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activation levels of underlying mental representations of mental simulation and 
implementation intentions.  
In order to measure breadth of information processing (Study 1 and 2), 
we asked participants to generate alternatives to situational opportunities and 
goal-directed responses. The structure of an if-then plan was reflected in the 
studies, such that the first study targeted the anticipated situation specified in the 
if-component of the implementation intention, and the second study targeted the 
critical response specified in the then-component. In the second study we further 
included a cognitive load condition to replicate previous findings showing that 
implementation intentions operate efficiently (e.g., Brandstätter et al., Study 2 
and 3), and to explore the effect of cognitive load on mental simulation. In both 
studies, we also measured the time of stimulus onset to the moment when 
participants first pressed a key on the keyboard. Hence, our main dependent 
variables in the first two studies consisted of the mean number of generated 
alternatives to presented stimuli and mean reaction times.  
To compare activation of mental representations of mental simulation and 
implementation intentions (Study 3 and 4), a lexical decision task was used. 
Specifically, activation of the mental representation of critical situational stimuli 
(Study 3) and goal-directed responses (Study 4) when mentally simulating or 
forming if-then plans was compared. In both studies, assigned implementation 
intentions and mental simulations were used to ensure that the observed 
heightened accessibility was not meddled by mere semantic relatedness between 
words.  
Study 1 
Method. Forty-three undergraduate students from an American University 
were given the goal to do well at school. About half of the participants were then 
asked to listen to a tape-recorded mental simulation describing three different 
situations related to the goal (i.e., reading a textbook and marking passages in it 
with a highlighter, taking notes on a notepad in a lecture, writing an essay on a 
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laptop). Thus, the three different situations participants had to listen to and 
visualize, contained a total of five critical study possibilities (i.e., highlighter, 
textbook, notepad, laptop, lecture). Participants were instructed to visualize the 
described situations as vividly as possible. The other half of the participants was 
asked to adopt five implementation intentions in the service of the adopted goal. 
The if-then plans contained the same five study possibilities described above as 
element of the if-part of the plans (e.g., “If I sit in front of my textbook, then I 
will read every passage very carefully”). Finally, participants in the mental 
simulation and implementation intention condition were seated in front of a 
computer and presented with the five study possibilities. For each stimulus, they 
were asked to come up with as many alternatives as possible during a time 
period of 3 minutes and to type these alternatives in the keyboard (e.g. if 
“textbook” was presented, participants could write “article, paper, PowerPoint 
presentation” etc). At the same time, we measured the time of stimulus onset 
(i.e., the presentation of the study possibilities on the computer screen) to the 
moment when participants first pressed a key on the keyboard to start writing 
down alternatives.  
Results. First, participants who had not complied with the instructions and 
had written answers that were unrelated to the experiment were excluded from 
the analysis (N = 5), resulting in a total of 38 participants that were included in 
the main analysis. Then, two independent raters who were unaware of the 
hypotheses under investigation counted responses of participants to the three 
different stimuli with regard to the number of generated possible alternatives. 
The numbers were then averaged across the three stimuli to provide an index for 
the number of overall generated alternatives. Interrater agreement was high (r = 
.91). Next, participants’ responses to the five critical stimuli were averaged to 
provide an overall index of generated possible alternatives and subjected to a 
one-factorial (technique: mental simulation vs. implementation intentions) 
ANOVA controlling for speed of typing.  
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A significant main effect for technique emerged, F(1, 37) = 5.64, p < .05. 
Participants who performed mental simulations generated more possible 
alternatives (M = 7.4, SD = 2.5) than did implementation intentions participants 
(M = 5.7, SD = 1.8). The reaction times to the five stimuli were also averaged to 
provide an overall index of how fast participants started writing down 
alternatives. On this measure, a significant main effect for technique was found: 
As expected, implementation intentions participants started faster with this task 
after stimulus presentation (M = 2586, SD = 792) than did mental simulation 
participants (M = 3344, SD = 1077), F(1, 37) = 6.42, p < .05.  
The results indicated that mental simulation participants created more 
possible alternatives for the presented situational cues than implementation 
intention participants. However, implementation intention participants started 
faster with writing down alternatives to the situational cues (i.e., they pressed a 
key on the keyboard faster after presentation if situational cues) than did mental 
simulation participants. We draw two conclusions based on these results. First, 
the mindset induced by mental simulation seems to enhance open-mindedness in 
the sense of having it easy to generate alternatives to presented situational cues. 
On the other hand, forming if-then plans seems to lead to a more closed-minded 
processing of information, as indicated by producing fewer alternatives. Second, 
we observed that if-then plans not only lead to an overall more narrow focus, but 
also lead to a stronger focus on the situation specified before-hand, indicated by 
faster reaction times to presented material when starting to write down 
alternatives by implementation intention participants. Taken together, these 
results suggest that mental simulation seems to create an exploratory mindset 
with associated open-mindedness, while if-then plans lead to a mindset with a 
more closed-minded focus on the situations specified in the if-part of the 
implementation intentions.   
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Study 2 
The second study targeted the then-component of an implementation 
intention. Besides replicating the previous results, we wanted to demonstrate that 
mental simulation leads to finding more possible alternative goal-directed actions. 
We also made some changes to the design in order to exclude some possible 
alternative explanations. First of all, we let mental simulation participants 
simulate freely (without a guided visualization) and we let implementation 
intentions participants choose their own plans, rather than having them learn a 
plan that did not originate from themselves as in Study 1. The advantage of 
mental simulation might have been due to the fact that implementation intentions 
participants could not choose their own personal implementation intentions and, 
therefore, might have been less motivated to work on the task. Furthermore, we 
included cognitive load to explore whether mental simulation would be affected 
by cognitive load. Finally, we gave participants three minutes to come up with 
possible alternatives. The design of Study 2, therefore, resulted in a 2 (self-
regulation technique: mental simulation vs. implementation intentions) x 2 
(cognitive load: yes vs. no) factorial design.  
Method. All participants (N = 102) were recruited at a German 
University and participated in this study as part of a course requirement. 
Upon their arrival at the lab, they were assigned to one of four experimental 
conditions. All participants were first given the goal to study effectively for 
an upcoming exam. Next, participants were presented with the manipulation 
of the self-regulation techniques: One half of participants was instructed to 
mentally simulate the process of studying for an exam, and the other half of 
participants was asked to specify implementation intentions related to 
studying for an exam. Specifically, mental simulation participants were 
asked to visualize three different situations of studying for an exam. They 
were provided with three different examples related to studying for an 
exam: reading a textbook, memorizing lecture materials, summarizing 
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passages of a textbook. Mental simulation participants were asked to choose 
three study situations that were most typical for them and to visualize each 
of the situations for at least three minutes. Next, they had to briefly write 
down what they had visualized. For instance, a mental simulation participant 
wrote the following: “I see myself sitting at my desk at home reading my 
textbook. Then, I start summarizing important passages in it.” 
Accordingly, implementation intention participants were presented 
with the same three examples of studying as mental simulation participants 
and were asked to form three implementation intentions related to the goal. 
For instance, participants specified the following implementation intention: 
“If I sit at my desk, then I will read my textbook.” After the experimental 
manipulation, participants had to fill out several questionnaires measuring 
potential mediators. At the same time, the experimenter prepared the 
individualized computer task by selecting three situational cues related to 
studying (e.g., textbook, desk, lecture) from participants’ materials. Next, 
participants were seated in front of a computer and presented with these 
three situational cues. As in the previous study, they were asked to come up 
with as many ways of how the situational cues could be used for studying as 
possible. If textbook was presented to a participant, for example, the 
participant wrote down on the keyboard “reading, summarizing, 
underlining”, i.e. all different kinds of behaviors related to studying that one 
could perform with a textbook. Again, we measured the time of stimulus 
onset to the moment when participants first pressed a key on the keyboard 
to start writing down behavior words. Additionally, cognitive load was 
manipulated by presenting consonants and vowels to half of the participants 
over headphones and asking them to count the vowels (manipulation for 
cognitive load suggested by Ditto et al., 1998) while working on the 
computer task.  
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Results. As in Study 1, participants who had not complied with the 
instructions (N = 4) were excluded from the analysis. Again, two 
independent raters counted participants’ generated action words. These 
numbers were then averaged across the three stimuli to provide an index 
for the number of overall generated action words. Interrater agreement was 
very high (r = .97). The averaged index of generated words was subjected 
to a 2 (technique: mental simulation vs. implementation intentions) x 2 
(cognitive load: yes vs. no) x 2 (order: mental simulation self-generated vs. 
implementation intentions self-generated) ANOVA. Speed of typing was 
again statistically controlled for. The analysis indicated a significant main 
effect for self-regulation technique, F(1, 98) = 9.56, p < .01. Mental 
simulation participants generated more action words related to studying (M 
= 12.8, SD = 4.3) than implementation intentions participants (M = 10.7, 
SD = 2.8). This effect was further qualified by a marginally significant 
interaction between self-regulation technique and cognitive load, F(1, 98) = 
2.26, p = .07 (one-sided). Follow-up test revealed that in the no load 
condition mental simulation participants (M = 12.9, SD = 5.2) and 
implementation intentions participants (M = 11.8, SD = 3.1) did not differ 
significantly with regard to the number of generated action words, t(49) = 
0.91, p = .37. However, under cognitive load mental simulation participants 
(M = 12.7, SD = 3.2) generated significantly more action words compared 
to implementation intentions participants (M = 9.5, SD = 2.0), t(50) = 3.18, 
p < .01. The results are depicted in Table 1.  
In order to provide an index for the overall response latencies, the three 
response latencies over the three stimulus words were averaged and then 
subjected to a 2 (self-regulatory technique: mental simulation vs. implementation 
intentions) x 2 (cognitive load: yes vs. no) ANOVA. The analysis yielded a 
significant main effect for self-regulation technique, F(1, 96) = 6.30, p < .05. 
Implementation intentions participants started faster with writing down action 
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words to presented situational cues (M = 2398, SD = 1060) than mental 
simulation participants (M = 2994, SD = 1350).  
In sum then, mental simulation participants generated more possible 
action words related to presented situational cues (i.e., the cues that were 
selected from the individual mental simulations or implementation intentions) 
than implementation intention participants. However, this effect was affected by 
the cognitive load manipulation: While mental simulation participants generated a 
higher number of action words than implementation intention participants under 
cognitive load, both groups performed equally well in the no load condition. We 
take this finding to mean that the open-mindedness activated by mental 
simulations seems to be unaffected by depletion of resources. The activated 
closed-mindedness by performing implementation intentions, on the other hand, 
seems to have been affected by the load manipulation, as indicated by the 
generation of more alternatives under no load than under load by implementation 
intention participants. In other words, closed-mindedness is increased by 
cognitive load. As in the before reported results, if-then plan participants 
responded faster to presented stimuli than mental simulation participants, with no 
differences observed among participants who were put under cognitive load and 
those under no-cognitive load. This finding is in line with research demonstrating 
that the formation of if-then plans leads to the automatic elicitation of goal-
directed responses (e.g., Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Bayer, et al., 2004). 
Remember that implementation intentions participants responded faster to 
presented material (situational cues in Study 1 and goal-directed actions in Study 
2) in both hitherto reported studies. We take this finding as evidence of a 
stronger focus on previously specified means when forming implementation 
intentions as compared to performing mental simulation. This finding also hints at 
basic cognitive processes (i.e., activation levels of mental representations) 
underlying the two different mindsets associated with implementation intentions 
(implemental mindset) and mental simulation (deliberative mindset). To address 
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this question, we designed two further studies that enabled us to measure 
activation levels of mental representations of implementation intentions vs. 
mental simulations.  
Specifically, in the next study, we compared activation of the mental 
representation of critical situational stimuli when performing mental simulations 
versus forming implementation intentions. To this end we used a lexical decision 
task, as indirect measures have become the norm to measure construct 
activation (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2002; Marsh & Landau, 1995; Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2000).  
Study 3 
Study 3 focused on the if-component of an implementation intention, 
assessing the mental representation of the specified situation and used assigned 
(vs. self-generated) mental simulations and implementation intentions to ensure 
that heightened accessibility would not be muddled by semantic relatedness 
between words. 
Method. In order to test our hypothesis, we had all participants (N = 67) 
adopt the goal to do well in school. The participants were undergraduate students 
at an American university who participated in the study as part of a course 
requirement. After adopting the goal, half the participants were assigned to the 
mental simulation condition and asked to listen to a tape-recorded mental 
simulation, describing three scenarios beneficial to the given goal (i.e., 
highlighting important passages in a textbook with a highlighter, writing an essay 
on a laptop, writing notes on a notepad during class). Hence, the mental 
simulation contained a total of five critical situational cues (i.e., textbook, 
highlighter, laptop, essay, notepad). The other half of participants was assigned 
to the implementation intention condition and asked to adopt two implementation 
intentions related to the goal. Each implementation intention contained one of the 
five situational cues mentioned above (e.g., “If I have a highlighter in my hand, 
then I will underline important passages in my lecture materials”). The remaining 
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situational cues (i.e., the situational cues that were not contained in their 
implementation intentions) were presented to implementation intentions 
participants through a “spelling test”. The test contained the three situational 
cues plus misspelled words and participants were asked to correct any misspelled 
words. This was done to ensure equal exposure to the stimuli across conditions.  
Finally, all participants were seated in front of a computer. Participants 
were told that they would now continue with another ostensibly unrelated task 
that was introduced as a task on lexical judgments. They were told that letter 
strings would appear on the screen and that they had to respond “yes” (by 
pressing one key on the computer’s keyboard) if the presented letter string was a 
legal English word and “no” (by pressing another key) if it was not. They were 
also instructed to react as fast and as accurately as possible. After ten “warm up” 
presentations, participants completed twenty trials that contained the five 
situational cues (i.e., textbook, highlighter, laptop, essay, notepad), five neutral 
words that were matched in length and word frequency, and ten nonwords. In 
each trial a fixation cross first appeared for 750ms in the middle of the screen, 
which was immediately followed by the letter string. The letter string disappeared 
when the participant responded and the next trial began. Response latencies were 
measured in milliseconds (ms) from the time of the stimulus onset (presentation 
of letter string) until the participant’s response. The order of appearance of the 
letter strings was randomized across participants. After the lexical decision task, 
participants were thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results. To remove participants’ outlying responses and not to loose too 
many data points, we chose to trim response latencies to within three standard 
deviations of each participant’s main response latency. Response latencies based 
on errors (i.e., subject pressed the “word” key when presented with a non-word) 
were also removed from the analysis, because the speed of participants’ incorrect 
responses cannot be explained in terms of accessibility (see Bargh, Chaiken, 
Govender & Pratto, 1992). Response latencies were collapsed across the 
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situational cues, neutral words, and nonwords, and a 2-between (self-regulation 
technique: mental simulation vs. implementation intentions) x 3-within (word 
type: situation word vs. neutral word vs. nonword) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted to ensure that there were no differences between the two 
experimental conditions in response to situational cues, neutral words, and 
nonwords. Whereas a main effect of word type emerged, F(2, 65) = 75.02, p < 
.01, demonstrating that participants reacted significantly faster to situational cues 
(M = 590, SD = 102.1) than to neutral words (M = 648.1, SD = 109.5) and 
nonwords (M = 750.8, SD = 153.5), the interaction between word type and self-
regulation technique was not significant, F(2, 65) = 2.05, p = .14.  
Next, we calculated the difference scores between situational cues and 
matched neutral words to measure participants’ accessibility of these words. The 
scored were then averaged to form the main dependent variable and subjected to 
a one-factorial (self-regulation technique: mental simulation vs. implementation 
intentions) ANOVA. As expected, difference scores were significantly higher for 
implementation intention participants (M = 99, SD = 140.1) than for mental 
simulation participants (M = 3.1, SD = 81.1), t(65) = -3.50, p < .01. Then, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with implementation intention 
participants only, comparing the averaged difference score of the two situational 
cues contained in the implementation intention with the averaged difference score 
of the three situational cues presented to participants in the “spelling test”. The 
ANOVA yielded a main effect for word type: The difference score of situational 
cues contained in the implementation intentions was marginally significantly 
higher (M = 99.00, SD = 140.10) compared to the situational cues contained in 
the “spelling test” (M = 51.95, SD = 78.48), F(1, 37) = 3.22, p = .08.  
Hence, the lexical decision task yielded a higher differences score for 
critical situational cues for implementation intention participants than for mental 
simulation. This result indicates that forming implementation intentions leads to 
higher activation levels for the situation-words than mentally simulating. The 
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results are in line with previous findings of implementation intention formation 
that suggest heightened accessibility of the specified situation (Faude, 2006; 
Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996).  
Additional analyses demonstrated that among implementation intention 
participants, only those situation-words that were part of an implementation 
intention showed higher activation levels, but not the situation-words that were 
presented in the “spelling test.” Mental simulation participants, on the other 
hand, demonstrated equal activation levels for all five situation-words, but their 
overall activation levels were lower than those of implementation intention 
participants. Thus, implementation intention participants seemed to focus on the 
two situational cues contained in their implementation intentions, while mental 
simulation participants focused on all five situation words equally strong. 
Recent research supports the idea that goal-directed responses are 
mentally represented and activated (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000a, b; Faude, 
2006). For instance, Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000a, b) found that habit related 
action words were highly activated, as demonstrated through a lexical decision 
task. In the case of implementation intentions, only one study thus far 
investigated the construct activation of the goal-directed behavior specified in the 
then-component, observing that the goal-directed response specified in an 
implementation intention is highly activated (Faude, 2006). No research has been 
conducted investigating this activation aspect with regard to mental simulation.  
The aim of our final study was many-fold. First, we wanted to replicate 
previous findings demonstrating higher activation of goal-directed responses 
through forming implementation intentions. Second, we wanted to replicate 
findings of our previous study and compare the activation of the mental 
representation of goal-directed responses when mentally simulating or forming 
implementation intentions. Third, we wanted to investigate the strength of mental 
links between mental representations of situational cues and respective goal-
directed responses in mental simulations and implementation intentions. Webb 
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and Sheeran (2006), for example, found that effects of implementation intentions 
were mediated by the strength of cue-response links.  
It was predicted that forming an implementation intention would lead to 
higher activation levels of goal-directed responses compared to mental 
simulation. Furthermore, activation levels of goal-directed responses when 
forming an implementation intention are expected to be particularly strong when 
the goal-directed response is primed with the respective situational cue.  
Study 4 
Study 4 targeted the then-component of an implementation intention, 
assessing the mental representation of the goal-directed response and also used 
assigned mental simulations and implementation intentions.  
Method. Sixty-nine undergraduate students at an American university 
participated in this study for partial course credit. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions (mental simulation with relevant prime, mental 
simulation with irrelevant prime, implementation intention with relevant prime, 
implementation intention with irrelevant prime). Upon arrival at the laboratory, 
participants were told that the experiment would entail several unrelated tasks. 
First, participants were asked to adopt the goal “to lead a healthy life-style”. 
Next, one half of the participants was asked to listen to a tape-recorded mental 
simulation describing three different goal-directed actions related to the goal (i.e., 
climbing the stairs, cooking a healthy meal, exercising in the gym). The other half 
of the participants had to adopt three implementation intentions containing the 
three goal-directed actions of the mental simulation in the then-part of the plan 
(i.e., “If I enter a multi-story building, then I will climb the stairs instead of taking 
the elevator”, “If I have a friend over for dinner, then I will cook a healthy meal 
that includes vegetables”, “If I am on campus and have some free time, then I 
will go exercise at the gym”).  
All participants were then told that the next involved word-related 
judgments and was unrelated to the prior task. Participants were seated in front 
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of a computer and asked to perform a lexical decision task. Each stimulus 
presentation was preceded by a subliminal presentation of a prime word. The 
lexical decision again comprised three types of words: three critical action words 
(cook, climb, exercise), three matched neutral words (coat, cease, estimate), and 
six nonwords. The critical action words and neutral words were tested for 
semantic relatedness prior to running the experiment. To this end, university 
students (N = 12) were asked to generate associations to action words and 
neutral words. As a result, one of the preselected neutral words was excluded and 
replaced by another semantically unrelated neutral word.  
In addition, one half participants was subliminally primed with situational 
cues related to the action words (building, campus, friend) and the other half was 
primed with irrelevant words (chapel, standard, method) during the lexical 
decision task. The prime words were presented sufficiently quickly so that they 
were outside participants’ awareness. This allowed for comparison of the strength 
of association between a relevant prime and a target response (e.g., building – 
climb) to the strength of association between an irrelevant prime and the same 
response (e.g., standard – climb) after mentally simulating or forming 
implementation intentions. After the computer task, participants were asked to fill 
out a questionnaire that measured their commitment to follow a healthy life-style, 
positive and negative affect, and how often they usually cook a healthy meal, 
climb the stairs, and exercise in their daily life.  
Results. Response latencies that lay outside of three standard deviations 
and error responses were excluded from the analysis. The trimming process 
resulted in the exclusion of 0.3% of the responses. The three response latencies 
of the three critical action words were averaged to form the main dependent 
variable. First, a 2-between (self-regulation technique: mental simulation vs. 
implementation intentions) x 3-within (word type: target vs. neutral vs. 
nonwords) ANOVA was conducted. A significant main effect of word type was 
observed, F(2, 85) = 30.32, p < .01, demonstrating that participants reacted 
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significantly faster to critical action words (M = 617, SD = 110) than to neutral 
words (M = 694, SD = 150) and nonwords (M = 820, SD = 151). Then, a 2-
between (experimental condition: mental simulation vs. implementation 
intentions) x 2-between (prime: relevant vs. irrelevant) x 2-within (word type: 
target vs. neutral) ANOVA was conducted. Results revealed a marginally 
significant word type x experimental condition interaction, F(2, 85) = 3.50, p = 
.06. As Table 2 demonstrates, implementation intention participants reacted 
considerably faster to critical action words (M = 617, SD = 109) than to neutral 
words (M = 712, SD = 168), whereas mental simulation participants reacted only 
slightly faster to critical action words (M = 621, SD = 112) than to neutral words 
(M = 677, SD = 129). However, no significant word type x experimental condition 
x prime interaction emerged, F(2, 85) = 0.49, p = .61, indicating that priming did 
not result in higher response rates following a relevant prime than following an 
irrelevant prime.  
In sum, the results of Study 4 replicate the results of Study 3, insofar as 
results of the lexical decision task indicated that participants who had formed 
implementation intentions responded faster to the action words describing the 
target response than to the words describing a neutral response. On the other 
hand, mental simulation participants reacted only slightly faster to target words 
compared to neutral words. Thus, the results of the present study indicate that 
forming implementation intentions also leads to a higher activation of the target 
response contained in the then-component (and not just to a heightened 
activation of the situational cue specified in the if-component, as observed in the 
previous study). However, results of Study 4 did not indicate any differences in 
reaction times when target words were preceded by a relevant prime (situational 
cue of if-component of implementation intention) or by an irrelevant prime. 
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General Discussion 
The model of action phases suggests that individuals in the predecisional 
phase (when choosing a goal) exhibit a deliberative mindset associated with a 
more open-minded processing of information, whereas individuals in the 
preactional phase (when planning the implementation of a goal) exhibit an 
implemental mindset with a more closed-minded processing of information. 
Hence, deliberative and implemental mindsets are theoretically and empirically 
associated with distinct action phases. In contrast, based on the current findings, 
we propose a more flexible approach to the question of mindsets and related 
phases of goal pursuit. Inasmuch as our findings hint at mental simulation and 
implementation intentions inducing two distinct mindsets, the former being 
associated with a more open-minded processing of information, and the latter 
associated with a more closed-minded processing of information, we postulate 
that depending on the type of planning technique (i.e., mental simulation vs. 
implementation intentions) used, a deliberative or implemental mindset is 
induced.  
Thus far, implementation intentions and mental simulation have been 
considered as self-regulatory techniques furthering goal attainment in the 
preactional phase through enhancing planning of goal-directed activities. The task 
of planning goal-directed actions in the preactional phase is facilitated through an 
implemental mindset (Gollwitzer, 1990). However, it is postulated that an 
individual performing mental simulation can also exhibit a deliberative mindset in 
the preactional phase to further the implementation of a chosen goal. As 
mentioned before, research on hindsight bias and counterfactual priming supports 
this idea, suggesting that activation of a mental simulation mindset results in 
generating and considering additional alternatives (Hirt & Markmann, 1995; Hirt, 
Kardes & Markmann, 2004; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1982).  
Studies 1 and 2 of the present research compared implementation 
intentions and mental simulation on their mode of cognitive functioning and 
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suggested that mental simulation leads to a more open-minded processing of 
information, whereas implementation intention leads to a more closed-minded 
processing of information. In both studies, breadth of information processing was 
measured by having participants find alternatives for different means to a goal 
(i.e., for situational cues in Study 1 and for goal-directed responses in Study 2). 
The results indicated that participants in the mental simulation condition found 
more alternatives to presented situational cues (Study 1) and to goal-directed 
responses (Study 2). Implicating that finding more alternatives is associated with 
a more open-minded processing of information, and finding fewer alternatives 
with a more closed-minded processing of information, we take these findings as 
an indication that mental simulation induces a deliberative mindset and 
implementation intentions induce an implemental mindset.  
While Study 1 only looked at differences regarding distinct mindsets 
activated by implementation intentions and mental simulation, Study 2 further 
included a cognitive load manipulation to investigate the effects of availability of 
cognitive resources on the activated mindsets. Results indicated that mental 
simulation participants generated a higher number of alternatives only under 
cognitive load, while both groups performed equally well in the no load condition. 
Hence, the mindset activated by implementation intentions (closed-minded 
processing of information) seems to be enhanced through cognitive load, while 
the mindset activated by mental simulation (more open-minded processing of 
information) seems to be unaffected by the depletion of resources.  
In addition, we measured reaction times from stimulus onset (i.e., 
situations and goal-directed behaviors that alternatives were supposed to be 
found for appearing on the computer screen) to the participants’ initial pressing of 
the keyboard when starting to come up with alternatives. In both studies, 
participants in the implementation intention condition responded faster to 
presented stimuli than mental simulation participants. Evidently, activating an 
implemental mindset through formation of implementation intentions leads to a 
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stronger focus on before-hand specified means to a goal (situation and goal-
directed behaviors) than performing mental simulations. We also interpreted this 
finding as a hint that there are differences regarding basic cognitive processes, 
such as activation levels of mental representations, which underlie the two 
mindsets activated by implementation intention and mental simulation.  
Study 3 and 4 were designed to investigate the suggested differences 
regarding cognitive processes resulting from different mindsets by measuring 
activation levels of mental representations of implementation intentions and 
mental simulation via a lexical decision task. Study 3 focused on the mental 
representation of situational cues, and Study 4 on the mental representation of 
behavioral responses, respectively. In both studies, implementation intention 
participants demonstrated heightened activation of mental representations 
compared to mental simulation participants. This indicates that the distinct 
mindsets triggered by implementation intentions and mental simulation that are 
associated with differences in information processing (closed-minded vs. open-
minded) base on different activation levels of mental representations of 
implementation intentions and mental simulation.  
In sum, the present research provides strong evidence for implementation 
intentions and mental simulation activating differential mindsets that result in a 
more closed-minded or more open-minded processing of information. As 
mentioned before, the found results question the so far stringent theoretical and 
empirical distinction between deliberative and implemental mindset based on 
distinct phases in the model of action phases. Evidently, individuals can exhibit a 
deliberative mindset in the preactional phase when performing mental 
simulations.  
Implications 
What are the implications then for the model of action phases and the 
distinct mindsets involved on the way to goal attainment? In other words, if 
implementation intentions and mental simulation are both self-regulation 
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techniques that foster goal attainment in the preactional phase, but do so through 
induction of different mindsets, when is it advisable to use one or the other? 
Should the decision of using either implementation intentions or mental 
simulation depend on, for example, personal preferences (i.e., one person might 
prefer to use mental simulation as a tool, while another person might prefer to 
form implementation intentions)? Or should it depend on considerations of 
effectiveness regarding specific circumstances related to the respective goal? 
Based on the present findings of differences in information processing related to 
use of mental simulations and implementation intentions (i.e., mental simulation 
leading to a more open-minded processing of information, and implementation 
intentions leading to a more closed-minded processing of information) we suggest 
that both planning techniques are effective at different stages in the preactional 
phase when planning the implementation of a goal. Mental simulation might be 
beneficial at the very beginning of planning goal-directed actions, as it induces a 
deliberative mindset associated with open-mindedness towards different types of 
information. When an individual has chosen a goal and moves on the preactional 
phase, mental simulation can help explore best ways of how to achieve that goal. 
On the other hand, once a decision for a path to a goal has been made, an 
individual should benefit from forming implementation intentions, which induce 
thoughts of when, where, and how to achieve the goal. In other words: in the 
preactional phase individuals might benefit from a deliberative mindset at the 
onset of planning goal-directed actions and an implemental mindset in a second 
step of finalizing specific plans. 
Imagine again that you adopted the goal to lead a healthy lifestyle, a 
rather complex goal that can be achieved through many different ways. If this is 
the first time for you to adopt such a goal, then you might need to consider what 
the different ways to attainment of that goal are, and then plan according goal-
directed actions. You might imagine that you eat healthier, do more sports, or 
stop smoking. At that stage of goal pursuit, you might benefit from performing 
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mental simulations to find out the best suitable way to your goal. After having 
chosen one option of how to achieve your goal, you have to start with planning 
according goal-directed actions. At this stage, you might benefit from forming 
implementation intentions to clarify when, where, and how you will eat healthier 
(if you had decided on that route to your goal).  
Taken together, we suggest that mental simulation and implementation 
intentions benefit the process of goal striving at different points in time and 
should therefore be employed accordingly.  
Limitations 
The results of the present research focused on investigation of the 
different mindsets associated with mental simulation and implementation 
intentions and only provide the basis for the assumption that the two self-
regulation techniques should be employed at different points in time. Further 
studies are needed that systematically investigate this assumption. A study is 
needed, for example, that has participants adopt a goal, and then instruct one 
half to first perform mental simulation and then specify implementation 
intentions, and instruct the other half to first specify implementation intentions 
and then perform mental simulation. Furthermore, a study is needed that 
investigates the employment of mental simulation and implementation intentions 
at different points in time in the pre-actional phase regarding goals with different 
complexity. Goals that are rather complex with many different ways to go about 
might particularly benefit from first performing mental simulations, and then 
specifying implementation intentions. However, goals that are not complex and 
have only one or more ways to go about might not need the performance of 
mental simulations to find out the best way to go about, and might just benefit 
from specification of implementation intentions.  
Conclusions 
 In conclusion, the studies presented in this line of research investigate cognitive 
processes (i.e., mindsets and activation of mental representations) triggered by 
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implementation intentions and mental simulations that allow us to understand 
how these two self-regulation techniques promote goal attainment. Based on the 
present findings, implications for the model of action phases are suggested. 
Specifically, it was postulated that depending on what planning technique (i.e., 
mental simulations or implementation intentions) is used an implemental or a 
deliberative mindset can be induced in the pre-actional phase. It is suggested 
when planning the implementation of a goal (in the pre-actional phase) that 
mental simulation and implementation intentions be used at two different points 
in time during that phase in order to benefit the process of goal striving most 
effectively.  
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Table 1  
Mean Ratings of Generated Alternatives as a Function of Self-Regulation 
Technique and Cognitive Load  
 Cognitive Load  
Self-Regulation Technique No Load  Load 
Mental Simulation 12.9 12.7 
Implementation Intentions 11.8 9.5 
 
 
Table 2 
Mean Reaction Times as a Function of Self-Regulation Technique and Word Type 
  Word Type 
Self-regulation technique  Target  Neutral 
Mental Simulation  621 677 
Implementation 
Intentions 
 617 712 
 
Note. Reaction Times were measured in milliseconds 
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Artikel 3: Mentale Repräsentationen und kognitive Prozesse der Wenn-
Dann-Planung  
(The Mental Representations and Cognitive Procedures of IF-THEN Planning)
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Introduction 
The cognitive processes that support and maintain goal pursuit have 
become a central issue among researchers studying self-regulation and 
motivation (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1994; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001; Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2000; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). Two key notions in self-regulation 
research on goals are the model of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 
1991; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) and the concept of implementation 
intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996), as both address the complex interaction of 
cognitive and motivational processes. The model of action phases posits distinct 
consecutive stages of goal pursuit an individual has to successfully navigate to 
attain a goal, whereas implementation intentions (a concept stimulated by the 
action phase model) are specific self-regulatory tools aimed at helping individuals 
plan and initiate goal-directed actions. The focus of this chapter is on expanding 
the existing theoretical and empirical framework of both the theoretical model of 
action phases and the concept of implementation intentions by critically 
investigating the postulated cognitive processes.  
The Model of Action Phases 
Most theories of motivation and self-regulation converge on the idea that 
committing to a goal is the key act of willing that promotes goal attainment (e.g., 
Ajzen, 1991; Atkinson, 1957; Bandura, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gollwitzer, 
1990; Locke & Latham, 1990). The basic assumption is that the strength of a 
person’s intention to reach a goal (i.e., the goal intention) determines prospective 
accomplishments (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; 
Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001; Sheeran, 2002). However, recent research on goals 
has demonstrated that variables other than strength of goal intention affect the 
intensity of goal striving and rate of goal attainment (reviews by Gollwitzer & 
Moskowitz, 1996; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001). Assuming that committing to a 
goal is only a first step toward goal realization, the model of action phases 
(Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) provides a 
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first comprehensive account of goal attainment construing goal achievement in 
terms of solving a number of consecutive tasks. Making a goal committment is 
viewed as only the first of these tasks, with planning how to achieve the goal, 
getting started, and successfully completing goal striving as equally important 
subsequent tasks. 
 The model posits four different consecutive action phases of goal pursuit: 
the predecisional phase, the preactional phase, the actional phase, and the 
postactional phase (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991; Heckhausen & 
Gollwitzer, 1987). The main task individuals have to solve in the first, 
predecisional phase, is to make the best possible choice between different wishes 
they entertain, because people cannot act on all of their wishes. To achieve this 
selection or prioritization, they weigh the pros and cons of their wishes. These 
deliberations involve criteria of desirability and feasibility. Desirability of potential 
outcomes is determined through reflecting on their expected value by estimating 
the pleasantness-unpleasantness of potential short-term and long-term 
consequences. For instance, individuals might contemplate whether a certain 
outcome will lead to certain positive consequences, such as higher self-esteem or 
positive evaluation by significant others. When contemplating on the feasibility of 
a wish, individuals may consider how much time and resources are needed to 
achieve it. Once a wish has been given the highest preference, individuals are 
ready to make a commitment to realize this wish (i.e., form a goal intention), and 
thus move on to the next phase.  
The main task in this subsequent postdecisional but still preactional phase 
is to plan the implementation of the chosen goal. Having formed a goal intention 
creates a feeling of committment, prompting people to start planning and 
implementing respective goal-directed actions for goal attainment. Accordingly, 
individuals in this phase address questions of when and where to start acting, 
how to act, and how long to act. The transition from the preactional phase to the 
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actional phase is marked by action initiation. Successful action initiation depends 
on seizing favorable opportunities as soon as they present themselves. 
Individuals in the actional phase finally engage in activities to achieve their goals. 
Here it becomes important to shield ongoing goal-directed activities from 
becoming derailed by distractions, difficulties, and hindrances. In the postactional 
phase, individuals have to solve the final task of evaluating the success of goal-
attainment. This involves contemplation of whether the intended outcomes have 
been sufficiently reached and whether the actual value of the achieved goal 
matches the expected value estimated beforehand.  
Mindsets and the Model of Action Phases 
The model of action phases implies that undertaking the four distinct tasks 
described above activate congruent mindsets (i.e., phase-typical cognitive 
procedures that promote successful task completion; Gollwitzer, 1990). So far, a 
body of research has theoretically and empirically distinguished between 
deliberative and implemental mindsets; that is, differences in cognitive processes 
when an individual is choosing a goal as compared to planning the attainment of 
a goal (summaries by Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; Gollwitzer, 
Fujita, & Oettingen, 2004).  
Deliberative and Implemental Mindsets: Empirical Support 
Research on the features of deliberative and implemental mindsets has 
primarily looked at differences in regard to two cognitive procedures: cognitive 
tuning and biased inferences. Several studies exploring differences between the 
two mindsets in cognitive tuning used the thought sampling technique to 
demonstrate that a deliberative mindset produces thoughts about expectancy-
value issues, that is, thoughts focusing on aspects of goal feasibility and 
desirability (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Puca & Schmalt, 2001; Taylor & 
Gollwitzer, 1995). On the other hand, thoughts of individuals in an implemental 
mindset are focused on the when, where, and how of goal implementation. Using 
a cued-recall task, Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller (1990) found in addition 
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that individuals in a deliberative mindset process information on expectancy-
value issues more effectively than individuals in an implemental mindset, while 
individuals in an implemental mindset process information on goal 
implementation more effectively than individuals in a deliberative mindset. These 
findings suggest that cognitive tuning in deliberative and implemental mindsets is 
task-congruous, that is, it is tuned toward thought contents that allow choosing 
between goals versus implementing a chosen goal, respectively.  
Further, research on biased information processing suggests that 
individuals in a deliberative mindset analyze information more impartially, as their 
task is to choose between different wishes (i.e., they need to decide which wish is 
to be turned into a binding goal). Individuals in an implemental mind-set, on the 
other hand, tend to analyze information in a more partial way, as they tend to 
look for information that justifies the goal choices made and thus supports goal 
implementation (Amor & Taylor, 2003; Gagne & Lydon, 2001; Gollwitzer & 
Kinney, 1989; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). For example, Taylor and Gollwitzer 
(1995, Study 3) have demonstrated in a study on considerations of pros and cons 
for decision-making, that an implemental mindset makes individuals consider 
pros fives times more than cons, while a deliberative mindset leads to the 
balanced consideration of pros and cons. These differences in considering pros 
and cons suggest that deliberating one’s wishes activates even-handed 
processing of information that should benefit a good goal decision (i.e., choosing 
goals that are desirable and feasible). Planning the implementation of a chosen 
goal, on the other hand, activates partial processing of information (i.e., 
preferential consideration of pros over cons). The latter should help defend the 
goal decision and thus protect it from questioning one’s goal commitment what 
otherwise could hinder goal attainment.   
Deliberative and Implemental Mindsets: Open-Mindedness to 
Information 
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A further suggested difference between deliberative and implemental 
mindsets is openness to information. Gollwitzer (1990) argues that due to the 
different tasks associated with deliberative and implemental mindsets (i.e., 
making a goal decision versus implementing a chosen goal) individuals in a 
deliberative mindset should be particularly open to any available information that 
might help them with the decision-making process (referred to as “general open-
mindedness to information”). When assessing desirability and feasibility, it seems 
beneficial to approach different pieces of information with a general open-
mindedness, because it is initially unclear which pieces of information are 
particularly relevant to the decision to be made. In contrast, individuals in an 
implemental mindset, are primarily concerned with information on the when, 
where, and how of goal implementation. They process information more 
selectively, focusing on goal-relevant stimuli, while ignoring goal-irrelevant 
stimuli. As a result, a deliberative mindset is associated with open-mindedness to 
information and an implemental mindset with more closed-minded processing of 
information.  
The suggested differences in open-mindedness between deliberative and 
implemental mindsets have recently been investigated by Fujita, Gollwitzer, and 
Oettingen (2007). In three studies, a deliberative mindset led to superior 
recognition memory for incidental information than an implemental mindset. For 
example, in Study 3, participants were either assigned to the deliberative 
mindset, the implemental mindset, or a control condition. After the mindset 
manipulation, all participants had to perform a computerized concentration test. 
Randomly during the test, participants were presented with semantically 
unrelated incidental words (e.g., bone, every, flag, always). After filling out 
various questionnaires, participants were asked to perform a surprise 
computerized recognition memory test containing the initially presented incidental 
words. Participants in the deliberative mindset performed significantly better on 
the recognition memory test than those in the implemental mindset and the 
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control conditions, indicating that deliberative mindsets are marked by more 
open-minded processing of available information than implemental mindsets.  
Implementation Intentions: A Strategy for Effective Self-
Regulation of Goal Pursuit 
As mentioned earlier, accumulated evidence indicates that the single act of 
willing involved in forming a goal intention does not appear to be sufficient to 
ensure goal achievement (review by Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Sheeran, 2002; 
Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Investigating the reasons for the modest intention-
behavior relation, it appears that this “gap” is largely due to the fact that people, 
despite having formed strong intentions, fail to act on them (e.g., Orball & 
Sheeran, 1998). To address this issue, Gollwitzer (1993, 1996, 1999) introduced 
the concept of implementation intentions to help overcome self-regulatory 
problems in goal striving. Stimulated by the action phase model, Gollwitzer 
suggested that successful goal attainment is facilitated by a second act of willing 
wherein the goal intention is furnished with an if-then plan (i.e., an 
implementation intention) that specifies in a concrete manner how a goal 
intention is to be realized. Such plans are assumed to help people successfully 
achieve the task they are confronted with in the preactional phase of goal pursuit 
– instigating actions that are instrumental to attaining the chosen goal.  
Implementation intentions are if-then plans that link good opportunities to 
act to behavioral responses that are effective in accomplishing one’s goals. 
Implementation intentions are to be distinguished from goal intentions. Whereas 
goal intentions specify what one wants to achieve (i.e., “I intend to reach Z!”), 
implementation intentions specify both the behavior that one will perform in the 
service of goal achievement and the situational context in which one will enact it 
(i.e., “If situation X occurs, then I will initiate goal-directed behavior Y!”). Thus, a 
goal intention refers to what one intends to achieve, whereas an implementation 
intention specifies when, where, and how one intends to achieve it.  
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To form an implementation intention, the person must first identify a 
response that will promote goal attainment and, second, anticipate a suitable 
occasion to initiate that response. For instance, a possible implementation 
intention in the service of the goal intention of pursuing a healthy life-style would 
link an appropriate behavior (e.g., ordering green tea) to a suitable situational 
context (e.g., having dinner at a restaurant). As a consequence, a strong link is 
created between the critical situation of having dinner at a restaurant and the 
goal-directed response of ordering green tea.  
A wealth of research has demonstrated the beneficial effects of 
implementation intentions as self-regulatory tool on goal attainment. For 
example, Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998) demonstrated that subjects who had 
formed an implementation intention in addition to a goal intention were able to 
solve more arithmetic problems despite being distracted by simultaneously shown 
film clips of advertisement, compared to subjects who had only formed a goal 
intention. Implementation intentions have been shown to be effective in 
promoting infrequently performed behaviors (e.g., cancer screening; Sheeran & 
Orbell 2000) and daily-performed behaviors (e.g., supplement use; Sheeran & 
Orbell, 1999), no matter whether self-report or objective measures of 
performance were taken (e.g., Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Milne, Orbell, & 
Sheeran, 2002). The effects on behavioral performance were shown among 
students, the general public, and clinical samples (e.g., Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 
2000; Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997; Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 
2001). To this end, Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) conducted a meta-analysis 
analyzing the effectiveness of implementation intentions for self-regulatory 
problems concerned with initiating goal pursuit, shielding ongoing goal pursuit 
from unwanted influences, disengaging from failing goals, and conserving 
capacity for future goal striving. Findings from 94 independent studies of the 
impact of implementation intentions on goal achievement showed that 
implementation intentions have a positive effect on goal attainment that is of 
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medium-to-large size (d = .65). This finding was robust across variations in study 
design, outcome measurement, and domains of goal attainment. 
So far, two processes have been proposed to explain why implementation 
intentions benefit goal achievement, relating either to the anticipated situation 
(i.e., the if-part) or the goal-directed behavior (i.e., the then-part). As forming 
implementation intentions implies the selection of a critical future situation (i.e., a 
viable opportunity), the mental representation of this situation is assumed to 
become highly activated and hence more accessible (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996, 
1999). Forming an implementation intention involves the selection of a situation 
that is ripe for action, thereby rendering the critical situation salient. This idea 
implies that people process information about the critical situation in a highly 
proficient manner (Gollwitzer, 1993; Gollwitzer, Bayer, Steller, & Bargh, 2004; 
Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Therefore, compared to those who merely form a 
respective goal intention, people who form implementation intentions are 
assumed to exhibit increased sensitivity to the critical cue. Various experiments 
(for a summary, see Gollwitzer, 1999) demonstrate that participants holding 
implementation intentions were more likely to detect (e.g., Steller, 1992), 
remember (e.g., Gottschaldt, 1926; Witkin, 1950), and attend (e.g., Seehausen, 
Bayer, & Gollwitzer, 1994) to the critical situation compared to participants who 
had only formed goal intentions.  
Implementation intentions have also been shown to benefit action 
initiation through processes of automatization (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996). Gollwitzer 
(1993) argues that forming an implementation intention (i.e., linking a critical 
situation to an intended behavior in the form of an if-then plan) is a conscious act 
of will that effectively delegates control of behavior from the self to specified 
situational cues that directly elicit action (also described as strategic “delegation 
of control to situational cues”). Forming an if-then plan means that the person 
commits herself in advance to acting as soon as certain contextual constraints are 
satisfied. Once the specified situation is encountered, action initiation should 
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proceed swiftly and effortlessly, without requiring the person’s conscious intent. 
Thus, the execution of a behavior specified in an implementation intention is 
assumed to exhibit features of automaticity as identified by Bargh (1992, 1994) 
and Moors and De Houwer (2006). The postulated automation of action initiation 
has been supported by the results of various experiments that tested immediacy 
(e.g., Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997, Experiment 3; Webb & Sheeran, 2006), 
efficiency (e.g., Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Lengfelder & 
Gollwitzer, 2001), and the absence of conscious intent (e.g., Bayer, Moskowitz, & 
Gollwitzer, 2004; Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005; overview by Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006). In sum, the facilitating effects of implementation intentions 
appear to be associated with enhanced accessibility of good opportunities to act 
(if-component) and with the automation of goal-directed responding (then-
component).  
Mental Simulation and Implementation Intentions: Two Distinct Self-
Regulation Techniques for Goal Striving 
In addition to implementation intentions, there are other self-regulation 
techniques that lead to successful goal attainment, namely mental simulations. 
Conceptually different from implementation intentions (i.e., linkage of cues and 
responses in an if-then format), mental simulations can best be described as 
“imitative mental representations of some event or a series of events” (Taylor & 
Schneider, 1989). When planning via mental simulation, a desired end state is 
approached through exploration of possible paths to goal attainment. Taylor, 
Pham, Rivkin, and Armor (1998) call such mental simulations process 
simulations, that is, the process of goal attainment is imagined step-by-step. 
Similar to implementation intentions, the effects of mental simulation have been 
found to promote goal attainment in many different domains, such as academic 
achievement (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Pham, 1999), improving health-
related behavior (Greitemeyer & Würz, in press), and facilitate behavioral 
intentions in the consumer domain (Escalas & Luce, 2003, 2004; Phillips, Olson, & 
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Baumgartner, 1995). Why do process-focused mental simulations benefit goal 
achievement? Several studies have demonstrated that the beneficial effects of 
mental simulation on the achievement of desired outcomes is linked to enhanced 
levels of planning, that is, action plan formation (Escalas & Luce, 2003, 2004; 
Rivkin & Taylor, 1999). Thus, both mental simulation and implementation 
intentions further goal attainment through enhanced planning of goal-directed 
actions.  
However, the way in which mental simulations benefit the planning 
process should differ from that furthered by implementation intentions. The 
planning process associated with a mental simulation is marked by exploration of 
possible means or paths to a goal; while the formation of an implementation 
intention leads to the selection of a suitable situation which is then linked to a 
goal-directed response. No research to date has compared the two self-regulation 
tools against each other to detect differences and commonalities. To address this 
question will help to better understand the various ways in which people can self-
regulate goal striving by planning.   
In the following section, we introduce four studies that compare the 
cognitive functioning of two distinct self-regulations tools: implementation 
intentions versus mental simulations. The first set of studies explores differences 
in mindsets induced by if-then plans versus mental simulation. The second set of 
studies builds upon the initial results and investigates activation levels of the 
underlying mental representations implicated by the different planning 
techniques. 
Research on Mindsets Induced by Implementation Intentions versus 
Mental Simulation 
Does mental simulation versus forming an if-then plan activate different 
mind-sets? If-then plans and mental simulations have thus far been considered as 
self-regulatory techniques that further goal attainment in the preactional phase 
through enhanced planning of goal-directed activities. The mindset associated 
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with this stage of the model of action phases is an implemental mindset 
(Gollwitzer, 1990). However, we postulate that an individual can also exhibit a 
deliberative mindset in the preactional phase when performing mental 
simulations. Empirical support for this assumption is provided by research on 
hindsight bias and counterfactual priming, which suggests that inducing a mental 
simulation mindset results in generating and considering additional alternatives 
(Hirt & Markmann, 1995; Hirt, Kardes & Markmann, 2004; Kahnemann & 
Tversky, 1982). As mentioned before, finding and considering alternative ways of 
goal attainment is a feature associated with an open-minded processing of 
information and hence resembles a deliberative mindset. On the other hand, 
several studies have demonstrated that forming if-then plans tunes individuals’ 
thoughts into the when, where, and how of goal implementation, a feature 
associated with an implemental mindset (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2006; 
Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Fujita, Gollwitzer, and 
Oettingen (2007) further argue that deliberative mindsets are associated with 
greater openness to different sources and types of information. An implemental 
mindset then again, is associated with filtering of information and selective 
processing of stimuli (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990; Kuhl, 1984). Therefore, the following 
two studies aimed at testing the following assumption: mental simulation induces 
a deliberative mindset associated with a more open-minded processing of 
information (i.e., considering various means for a given goal), whereas forming 
if-then plans induces an implemental mind-set associated with a more closed-
minded processing of information (i.e., focusing on one particular means to a 
given goal).  
In order to measure breadth of information processing, we asked 
participants to generate alternatives of situational opportunities and goal-directed 
responses. Situational cues and goal-directed responses are both considered as 
means to a goal and represent the two parts of an implementation intention, that 
is the if-part and the then-part. The structure of an if-then plan was reflected in 
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our studies, such that the first study targeted the anticipated situation specified in 
the if-component of the implementation intention, and the second study targeted 
the critical response specified in the then-component. The second study further 
included a cognitive load condition a) to replicate previous findings showing that 
implementation intentions operate efficiently (e.g., Brandstätter et al., Study 2 
and 3) and b) to explore the effect of cognitive load on mental simulation.  
In the first study, undergraduate students were asked to adopt the goal 
“to do well in school.” Next, half of the participants listened to a tape-recorded 
mental simulation, describing three different scenarios beneficial to the given goal 
(i.e., reading a textbook and marking passages in it with a highlighter, taking 
notes on a notepad in a lecture, writing an essay on a laptop). Participants were 
instructed to visualize the described scenarios as vividly as possible. In sum, the 
three scenarios contained a total of five critical situational cues (i.e., highlighter, 
textbook, notepad, laptop, lecture). The other half of the participants was asked 
to adopt five implementation intentions in the service of the adopted goal. The 
assigned if-then plans contained the same five situational cues described above 
as elements of the if-part of the plans (e.g., “If I sit in front of my textbook, then 
I will read every passage very carefully”). Finally, participants in the mental 
simulation and implementation intention conditions were seated in front of a 
computer and presented with the five situational cues. For each stimulus, they 
were asked to come up with as many alternatives as possible during a time 
period of 3 minutes. At the same time, we measured the time of stimulus onset 
(i.e., the presentation of the situational cues on the computer screen) to the 
moment when participants first pressed a key on the keyboard to start typing in 
alternatives. Hence, our dependent variables consisted of the mean number of 
generated alternatives to the presented stimuli and mean reaction times.  
Mental simulation participants created more possible alternatives for the 
presented situational cues than implementation intention participants. However, 
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after presentation of the situational cues, implementation intention participants 
started faster with typing in alternatives to the cues than mental simulation 
participants. The conclusions of the reported results are twofold. First, the 
mindset induced by mental simulation seems to enhance open-mindedness in the 
sense of having it easy to generate alternatives to presented situational cues. On 
the other hand, forming if-then plans seems to lead to a more closed-minded 
processing of information, as indicated by producing fewer alternatives. Second, 
we observed that if-then plans not only lead to an overall more narrow focus, but 
also lead to a stronger focus on the situation specified before-hand, indicated by 
implementation intention participants’ shorter reaction times between stimulus 
onset (i.e., presentation of the situational cues) and their initial response (i.e., 
starting to type in alternatives for the presented cues). Overall, these results 
suggest that mental simulation seems to create an exploratory mindset with 
associated open-mindedness, while if-then plans lead to a mindset with a more 
closed-minded focus on the situations specified in the if-part of the 
implementation intentions.  
The second study targeted the then-component of an implementation 
intention. Besides replicating the previous results, we wanted to demonstrate that 
mental simulation leads to finding more possible goal-directed actions. 
Furthermore, we included cognitive load to explore whether mental simulation 
would be affected by cognitive load. The procedure of this study was very similar 
to the previous one with the exception that participants had to generate their own 
mental simulations or implementation intentions (as opposed to listening to a 
pre-recorded mental simulation or adopting assigned if-then plans). The goal 
given to participants was “to study effectively for an upcoming exam.” Mental 
simulation participants were asked to visualize three different self-generated 
scenarios of studying for an exam. To this end, mental simulation participants 
were provided with three general examples of scenarios they could visualize (i.e., 
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reading a textbook, memorizing lecture materials, summarizing passages of a 
textbook), but were then prompted to come up with their own scenarios. They 
were told to visualize each scenario for at least one minute. After each 
visualization participants had to briefly summarize the content of their 
visualization (e.g., “I see myself sitting at home at my desk and writing a paper 
for class”). Accordingly, participants in the implementation intention condition 
were first provided with the same three examples of studying as mental 
simulation participants and then asked to generate three different if-then plans 
related to this goal. Specifically, they were asked to specify when, where, and 
how they would study. Implementation intention participants specified, for 
instance, “If I sit at home at my desk, then I will read my textbook carefully,” or 
“If I am in the library, then I will read my lecture materials.” They were told to 
read each of the three self-generated plans three times. Next, all participants 
were presented with three of the situational cues related to studying they had 
previously specified (e.g., textbook, desk, lecture material) on a computer 
screen. For each presented cue, they were asked to generate as many goal-
directed responses (i.e., behaviors they considered as beneficial for the given 
goal in that particular situation) as possible. For example, if “desk” was one of the 
previously generated situations of a particular participant, she might have 
generated “writing, reading, concentrating” as different kinds of behaviors related 
to studying that she thought of performing at a desk (i.e., goal-related 
responses). The situational cues presented to participants on the computer screen 
differed for each participant, as they were chosen from their individually created 
materials. As soon as they started working on the computer task, half of the 
mental simulation and half of the implementation intention participants were put 
under cognitive load by asking them to count the number of vowels presented to 
them over headphones.  
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Mental simulation participants generated more possible action words 
related to presented situational cues (i.e., the cues that were selected from the 
individual mental simulations or implementation intentions) than implementation 
intention participants. However, this effect was affected by the cognitive load 
manipulation: Mental simulation participants generated a higher number of action 
words than if-then plan participants only under cognitive load, while under no 
load both groups performed equally well. Evidently, the open-mindedness 
activated by mental simulations seems to be unaffected by depletion of 
resources. The generation of more action words under no load than under load by 
if-then plan participants, on the other hand, indicates that the activated closed-
mindedness was also affected by the load manipulation. In other words, closed-
mindedness is increased by cognitive load. It appears then, that the cognitive 
orientation typical for mental simulation (open-mindedness) versus forming 
implementation intentions (closed-mindedness) is enhanced when cognitive 
resources become scarce. As habitual behavioral and cognitive orientations are 
commonly unaffected by load, we take this finding to mean that the habitual 
cognitive orientation of mental simulation is open-mindedness, whereas the 
habitual cognitive orientation of forming implementation intentions is closed-
mindedness.  
Research on the Activation of Mental Representations by Implementation 
Intentions versus Mental Simulations 
In the next two studies we compared the activation of the mental 
representations that underlie if-then plans and mental simulations. As indirect 
measures have become the norm to measure construct activation (e.g., 
Kruglanski et al., 2002; Marsh & Landau, 1995; Shah & Kruglanski, 2000), we 
used a lexical decision task. Specifically, we compared the activation of the 
mental representation of critical situational stimuli and goal-directed responses 
when mentally simulating or forming if-then plans. One study focused on the if-
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component of an implementation intention, assessing the mental representation 
of the specified situation, whereas the other study focused on its then-
component, assessing the mental representation of the goal-directed response. In 
both studies, assigned if-then plans and mental simulations were used to ensure 
that heightened accessibility would not be muddled by semantic relatedness 
between words.  
Upon their arrival at the laboratory, participants were asked to adopt the 
goal “to do well in school.” Next, mental simulation participants had to listen to a 
tape-recorded mental simulation, describing three scenarios beneficial to the 
given goal (i.e., highlighting important passages in a textbook with a highlighter, 
writing an essay on a laptop, writing notes on a notepad during class). Hence, the 
mental simulation contained a total of five critical situational cues (i.e., textbook, 
highlighter, laptop, essay, notepad). Implementation intention participants were 
asked to adopt two if-then plans related to the goal, each plan containing one of 
the five situational cues mentioned above (e.g., “If I have a highlighter in my 
hand, then I will underline important passages in my lecture materials”). 
Implementation intention participants were presented with the remaining 
situational cues (i.e., the situational cues that were not contained in their if-then 
plans) through a “spelling test” to ensure equal exposure to the stimuli across 
conditions. This test contained the three situational cues plus misspelled words 
and participants were asked to correct any misspelled words. Finally, all 
participants were seated in front of a computer screen to perform a lexical 
decision task that contained the five situational cues (i.e., textbook, highlighter, 
laptop, essay, notepad), five matched neutral words, and ten nonwords.  
The lexical decision task yielded faster reaction times to critical situational 
cues for implementation intention participants than for mental simulation. This 
result indicates that forming implementation intentions leads to higher activation 
levels for the situation-words than mentally simulating. Additional analyses 
demonstrated that among implementation intention participants, only those 
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situation-words that were part of an if-then plan showed higher activation levels, 
but not the situation-words that were presented in the “spelling test.” Mental 
simulation participants demonstrated equal activation levels for all five situation-
words, but their overall activation levels were lower than those of implementation 
intention participants. Thus, implementation intention participants seemed to 
focus on the two situational cues contained in their implementation intentions, 
while mental simulation participants focused on all five situation words equally 
strong.  
The aim of a follow-up study was to replicate these findings with regard to 
the then-component of an implementation intention. This time, we used the goal 
“to lead a healthy life-style.” One half of the participants had to perform a mental 
simulation describing three different goal-directed actions related to the goal (i.e., 
climbing the stairs, cooking a healthy meal, exercising in the gym). The other half 
of the participants had to adopt three if-then plans containing the three goal-
directed actions of the mental simulation in the then-part of the plan (i.e., “If I 
enter a multi-story building, then I will climb the stairs instead of taking the 
elevator”, “If I have a friend over for dinner, then I will cook a healthy meal that 
includes vegetables”, “If I am on campus and have some free time, then I will go 
exercise at the gym”). Next, participants had to perform a lexical decision task 
containing the three critical action words, three matched neutral words, and six 
non-words.  
Results of the lexical decision task indicated that participants who had 
formed if-then plans responded faster to the action words describing the target 
response than to the words describing a neutral response. On the other hand, 
mental simulation participants reacted only slightly faster to target words 
compared to neutral words. Thus, the results of the present study indicate that 
forming if-then plans also leads to a higher activation of the target response 
contained in the then-component (and not just to a heightened activation of the 
situational cue specified in the if-component, as observed in the previous study).  
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In sum, the findings of the last two studies presented suggest that forming 
if-then plans not only leads to higher activation of the specified situational cues, 
but also to higher activation of the before-hand specified behavioral response, as 
is observed for mental simulations that contain these situations and responses.  
Implementation Intentions as Mental Constructs: Recent Findings 
The two latter studies presented above primarily addressed the question of 
how the different modes of information processing that implementation intentions 
and mental simulations trigger (i.e., closed- vs. open-mindedness) are associated 
with different activation levels of the mental representations of relevant situations 
and responses. However, these results also provide new insights about the basic 
cognitive properties that may underlie the beneficial effects of implementation 
intention formation per se. According to the present findings, formation of 
implementation intentions (i.e., if-then linkage of specified situations and goal-
directed behaviors) leads to higher activation of the mental representations of 
both of an if-then plan’s components (i.e., the situation and the goal-directed 
behavior) in comparison to the mental representation of respective components 
that have only been mentally simulated. 
As mentioned earlier, two component processes have so far been 
postulated and empirically supported to explain implementation intentions’ 
effectiveness:  heightened accessibility of the specified situation and automatic 
initiation of the goal-directed behavior. In other words, only one component of if-
then plans, that is the specified situation, has been referred to and investigated 
on a cognitive level. Yet the question of how the goal-directed behavior (i.e., the 
then-component) is mentally represented has received no theoretical analysis or 
empirical attention. Rather, hitherto research on the then-component of an 
implementation intention has been limited to a behavioral level, investigating the 
features of goal-directed behavior when being triggered by the specified situation. 
That is, the specified behavior within an implementation intention has been 
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merely conceptualized as automatic response to the stimulus cue, without 
consideration of potential intervening mental processes.  
Hence, above reported results not only contribute to evidence that forming 
an if-then plan enhances activation of the if-component, but also constitute first 
evidence of the mental representation and heightened activation of the plan’s 
then-component upon implementation intention formation. It therefore seems 
plausible to argue that (a) two cognitive processes – the heightened activation of 
the if- and then-component, respectively –underlie the beneficial effects of 
implementation intention formation and that (b) upon formation of an 
implementation intention (i.e., linking the specified situation to the goal-directed 
response) both components, that is the if- and then-component, become 
activated at the same time. However, these conclusions are premature 
particularly as activation levels of the if- and then-components of implementation 
intentions were measured in two separate studies and in each study the if-then 
plans were formed in the service of a different goal.  
Therefore, the following line of research (Faude, 2005) attempted a 
critical, more specific test of the hypothesis of co-activation of implementation 
intentions’ two components. Specifically, the following assumptions were made 
regarding the anticipated situation and the goal-directed behavior as elements of 
an implementation intention: (1) Both components are mentally represented as 
knowledge structure and become simultaneously highly activated upon formation 
of the if-then plan, and (2) the heightened accessibility of both elements is a 
result of (a) their superior status due to having been linked in an ‘if-then’ format, 
and (b) the functional relation between the two components. Three experiments 
tested these assumptions using lexical decision latencies to assess levels of 
activation.  
Forming If-Then Plans: Activation of Both Components? 
It was determined that the best method to preliminarily investigate the 
mental representation of implementation intentions’ both components was to 
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compare the accessibility of the anticipated situation and the goal-directed 
behavior between participants who had been asked to form if-then plans 
(experimental condition) and participants who had been equally exposed to the 
situation- and behavior-words but had not formed a plan (yoked control 
condition). Based on Gollwitzer’s (1993, 1996) argument that the selection of an 
implementation intention’s particular component leads to heightened activation, 
the first study used self-generated if-then plans.  
Experimental subjects were first asked to generate self-relevant goals in 
one of two given domains (i.e., health and personal relationships) by completing 
the sentence “I want to …” (e.g., “I want to improve my relationship.” as 
interpersonal goal). Second, subjects were asked to list four behaviors (e.g., 
“forgive) they thought of beneficial for achieving their goal and then asked to 
generate relevant situations (e.g., “conversation”) in which they wanted to carry 
out the behaviors they had listed before. Finally, they were asked to form 
implementation intentions by formulating an “IF..., THEN…” plan using the 
previously generated behaviors and situations to fill in the blanks and create a 
meaningful sentence (e.g., “IF I am disappointed in a conversation, THEN I will 
forgive!”). In sum experimental participants were asked to form eight 
implementation intentions (four per goal). Control participants were yoked to 
experimental participants by being exposed to the situation- and behavior-words 
that the respective experimental participant had generated beforehand, this by 
asking them to work on word lists.  
Next, a lexical decision was administered to measure the accessibility of 
implementation intentions’ components. The lexical decision included the critical 
words (i.e., previously generated situations and goal-directed responses) and 
non-words. Hence, the words used in the lexical decision task differed for each 
participant in the experimental condition. Within the yoked control condition, the 
words in the lexical decision task corresponded to the materials of the participant 
in the implementation intention condition they were yoked to.   
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Participants who had generated if-then plans responded significantly faster 
to situation-words and behavior-words than participants in the yoked control 
condition who had not formed plans. Applying the standard assumption that 
faster latencies reflect more activation (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1978), the present findings indicate that linking a specified situation to a goal-
directed behavior in an if-then format (i.e., forming an implementation intention) 
leads to enhanced activation of the mental representation of both components of 
the plan (i.e., the specified situation and the goal-directed behavior).  
Components of If-Then Plans: Co-Activation Due to Their Functional 
Relation and Superior Status  
The reasons behind conducting Experiment 2 were multifold. First, the aim 
was to replicate findings of Experiment 1 by introducing assigned (vs. self-
generated) implementation intentions. Introducing assigned plans allowed for 
testing of the hypothesis that the heightened accessibility of implementation 
intentions’ components is due to the superior status of the anticipated situation 
and the goal-directed behavior upon being linked in an if-then format and not due 
to a generation effect of the components. Second, to further investigate the 
superior status hypothesis, Experiment 2 used the same basic design as 
Experiment 1, but was augmented in the following ways. An equifinal goal-plan 
structure was used that included one goal only and six implementation intentions. 
According to conventional goal architecture, lateral relations within a goal system 
are assumed to be primarily inhibitory (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah, Kruglanski, 
& Friedman, 2003). Introducing several lateral relations on mean level by 
assigning multiple implementation intentions in the service of one goal should 
allow for conservative testing of the accessibility of the mental representation of 
the plans’ components. Further, a new condition was added in which participants 
were assigned the same goal intention as participants in the implementation 
intention condition, but were not assigned any plan. Including a “goal-only” 
condition allowed addressing the question if holding a goal intention only might 
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suffice to activate certain goal facilitating situations and behaviors, without the 
need of forming specific plans. Third, to provide more direct support for the 
argument that heightened activation of implementation intentions’ components is 
based on a functional (and not merely semantic) relation between these 
components, only semantically unrelated words were chosen for the situation and 
goal-directed behavior of to be assigned implementation intentions.  
The materials consisted of one goal intention (i.e., “becoming socially 
integrated”) plus six corresponding if-then plans. The implementation intentions 
were formulated to suit the participants (i.e., students) and to serve the 
attainment of the goal intention (e.g., “If I am at the gym, then I will introduce 
myself to a fellow student.”). Each if-then plan contained two critical words for 
the lexical decision task that corresponded to the situation (e.g., “gym”) and the 
goal-directed behavior (e.g., “introduce”). First, the goal was assigned to 
participants in the implementation intention condition and goal-only condition by 
asking them to read the goal and write it down. Next, subjects in the 
implementation intention condition were asked to adopt the six plans by reading 
the plans and then filling in blanks that denoted the situation- and behavior-
words (e.g., “If I am at the  ____, then I will ____ myself.”). Subjects in the 
goal-only and control condition were presented with a word list that contained the 
situation- and behavior-words of the implementation intentions in order to ensure 
equal encoding of the critical words to be used in the lexical decision task across 
conditions. Finally the identical lexical decision task was introduced to all three 
conditions.  
Forming assigned implementation intentions lead to heightened activation 
of both its components (i.e., the specified situation and the goal-directed 
behavior), as indicated by shorter mean response times to the situation and 
behavior-words for subjects who had formed if-then plans compared to subjects 
who had not (i.e., goal-only and control participants). Further, response times to 
the critical words did not differ between the goal-only and the control condition 
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and comparing response latencies between the different plans in the 
implementation intention condition revealed no significant differences.  
Demonstrating the robustness of the previous findings (i.e., simultaneous 
activation of if-then plans’ both components upon having formed an 
implementation intention), this result was hereinafter referred to as plan 
activation effect. In particular, the results offer evidence that this effect is 
functional rather than semantic (as only semantically unrelated words were 
used). In addition, activation of if-then plans’ components were found to be 
neither attributable to a generation effect of the components (as assigned 
implementation intentions were used), nor to a goal activation effect (as reaction 
times between the goal-only condition and the control condition did not differ). 
Indicating that the plan activation effect is a result of a superior status of the 
components of implementation intentions. The ‘superior status’ is further 
supported by the fact that the plan activation effect was found within an equifinal 
goal system of one goal with several, potentially reciprocal inhibiting, lateral 
relations on means level (i.e., six implementation intentions). The 1-goal – 6-
plans structure did not attenuate the response latency advantage of the specified 
situations and the goal-directed behaviors. In addition, comparing response times 
between the different plans revealed no significant differences, indicating that the 
strength (i.e., the activation) of one plan’s components was not weakened by the 
presence of other available plans linked to that goal. That plan activation seems 
to be independent of competition among different if-then plans and that the 
components within an implementation intention appear to be less susceptible to 
inhibition as means in a conventional sense, attests to the superior status of the 
specified situation and the goal-directed behavior by being linked in an if-then 
format.  
Automaticity in Plan Activation 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate if the effect of plan activation 
is based on a consciously controlled process (i.e., requiring cognitive resources), 
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or rather due to an automatic process that is characterized by its crucial features 
of immediacy, efficiency (i.e., not requiring much cognitive resources), and lack 
of conscious intent (Bargh, 1994, 1996, 1997; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Logan, 
1992; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Findings of the two previous experiments can 
so far be interpreted as the plan activation process displaying two characteristics 
of automaticity, namely the lack of conscious intent (as the measure of activation 
consisted of an indirect measure, i.e., lexical decision) and immediacy (as higher 
activation of if-then plans’ components could be observed from the onset of 
activation measurement). However, thus far it is unclear if the cognitive 
advantage of implementation intentions’ components is contingent on the amount 
of available cognitive resources. It might be that upon forming an implementation 
intention, its components (i.e., the situation and the goal-directed behavior) 
initially become more salient, but that a consciously controlled process, such as 
the selective use of a strategy (e.g., rehearsing or imagining the if-then plan) 
might be needed to then activate these components. In this case, plan activation 
would be contingent on the amount of available cognitive capacity. However, if 
the activation of implementation intentions’ components does not require a 
controlled process but rather runs off automatically upon forming an 
implementation intention due to the components’ superior status, then plan 
activation should be found even when mental load is high (i.e., cognitive 
resources are taxed).  
In order to address the question of automaticity in if-then plan activation, 
the lexical decision task in Experiment 3 was administered under mental load and 
activation levels of if-then plans’ components were compared between 
implementation intentions and goal-only subjects. Based on the design of 
Experiment 2, in Experiment 3, high levels of cognitive load were induced by 
presenting the target words in the lexical decision with a background pattern 
(following Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell, & Mayhorn, 1997). The dual-task 
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consisted of participants having to remember how many different background 
patterns they saw simultaneously to making lexical decisions. 
As predicted, a higher activation of implementation intentions’ components 
was also found under conditions of high cognitive load as indicated by shorter 
mean response times to the situation- and behavior-words in the implementation 
intention condition compared to the goal-only condition. Evidently, the plan 
activation effect is based on an automatic process that does not require cognitive 
resources. Taken together, the results of Study 3 (a) closely replicate the plan 
activation effect (i.e., co-activation of implementation intentions’ both 
components upon formation of such plans) found in Studies 1 and 2 and (b) show 
that this effect appears to fulfill the three criteria of automaticity: immediacy, lack 
of conscious intent, and efficiency (i.e., not requiring cognitive resources; Bargh, 
1994, 1996, 1997; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Logan, 1992).  
Conclusions and Implications  
This chapter had two primary objectives. First, it contrasted 
implementation intentions and mental simulations (i.e., two planning strategies 
shown to enhance goal attainment) on their mode of cognitive functioning, and 
based on the results, suggested implications for the model of action phases. 
Second, the basic cognitive properties of implementation intentions were mapped 
out by investigating the mental representation of its two components (i.e., the 
specified cue and the goal-directed response).  
At the outset of the chapter, the so far stringent theoretical and empirical 
association of deliberative and implemental mindsets with distinct action phases 
(i.e., the predecisional and the preactional phase, respectively) was questioned 
(Würz, Gollwitzer, & Greitemeyer, 2007). According to the model of action 
phases, choosing a goal (in the predecisional phase) activates a deliberative 
mindset, whereas planning the implementation of a goal (in the preactional 
phase) activates an implemental mindset. In contrast, we proposed a more 
flexible approach to the question of mindsets and related stages of goal pursuit. 
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We postulated that becoming involved with planning the implementation of a 
chosen goal induces an implemental or a deliberative mindset, depending on what 
planning technique (i.e., mental simulations or implementation intentions) is 
used. The results of two studies were consistent with this postulate.  
In Studies 1 and 2, open- versus closed-minded information processing 
(as characteristic of differential mindsets) for participants in an implementation 
intention and a mental simulation condition was investigated by having to 
generate different means to a goal (i.e., situational opportunities in Study 1 and 
goal-directed responses in Study 2). In both studies, participants in the mental 
simulation condition came up with more means compared to participants in the 
implementation intention condition. These results indicate that mental simulation 
induces a deliberative mindset associated with more open-mindedness (a feature 
previously solely associated with the predecisional phase), whereas 
implementation intentions induce an implemental mindset associated with closed-
mindedness (so far the only feature associated with the preactional phase). 
Hence, according to these findings, a deliberative and an implemental mindset 
can be activated within the preactional phase of goal pursuit depending on what 
self-regulation tool (i.e., implementation intentions or mental simulations, 
respectively) an individual chooses to apply.  
In addition, in Studies 1 and 2, reaction times from stimulus onset (i.e., 
appearance of situational cues on the computer screen to which participants were 
asked to either find alternative situations or generate corresponding goal-directed 
behaviors) to the participants’ initial pressing of the keyboard when generating 
means (i.e., situational opportunities or goal-directed responses) were measured. 
Implementation intention participants responded faster to the presented 
materials than did mental simulation participants. This finding was first of all 
interpreted as evidence of a stronger focus on previously specified means as part 
of forming implementation intentions as compared to engaging in mental 
simulations. Second, this result was construed as a possible indicator of the basic 
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cognitive processes (i.e., activation levels of mental representations) that 
underlie the differential mindsets induced by implementation intentions and 
mental simulations, respectively. To address this question, two further studies 
measured activation levels of implementation intentions’ and mental simulations’ 
respective mental representations via a lexical decision task. Forming 
implementation intentions was found to result in heightened activation of the 
mental representation of situational cues (Study 3) and behavioral responses 
(Study 4), compared to mental simulation participants. This result was 
interpreted as evidence that differential activation levels of the mental 
representations of implementation intentions and mental simulations underlie the 
distinct information processing modes that these two self-regulation tools trigger 
(i.e., closed- versus open-mindedness, respectively). 
The second line of research (Faude, 2005) presented in this chapter marks 
the first direct attempt to map out implementation intentions as knowledge 
structures (i.e., as cognitive representations of a specified situation and a goal-
directed behavior linked in an if-then format) and the first direct test of 
simultaneous activation of the mental representation of both components of 
implementation intentions (i.e., the situational cue and the goal-directed 
response) upon formation of such plans. In three experiments, forming 
implementation intentions lead to shorter response times on a lexical decision 
task for situation- and behavior-words (i.e., the if- and then-components of the 
previously formed if-then plans), relative to neutral words and relative to a 
condition in which only a goal intention was activated. Implicating that the 
formation of an implementation intention (i.e., linking a situational cue and a 
goal-directed response in an if-then format) leads to a heightened co-activation of 
the mental representation of its both components, this finding was termed “the 
plan activation effect.” 
Specifically, in Study 1, self-generation of implementation intentions was 
found to result in heightened activation of both components (i.e., the cue and the 
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response), compared to a condition in which no plans were generated. Studies 2 
and 3 replicated the plan activation effect with assigned implementation 
intentions implying that the heightened activation is a result of a superior status 
of the if- and then-component (as part of an implementation intention), and not 
due to a generation effect of the components. The superior status of the 
components of if-then plans was further supported by Studies 2 and 3 where it 
was demonstrated that (a) assigning (i.e., activating) a goal intention only, 
without corresponding plans, did not suffice to activate certain goal facilitating 
situations and behaviors (rather, plan activation was contingent on assignment of 
implementation intentions in addition to an underlying goal intention), and that 
(b) the plan activation effect could be obtained under conditions of several plans 
competing for resources in the face of a shared goal. In addition, Studies 2 and 3 
provided evidence that forming implementation intentions leads to heightened 
activation of the specified situation and the goal-directed behavior as a result of 
their functional relation (i.e., having been linked in an if-then format), rather than 
due to their semantic relation. Lastly, the results of Study 3 demonstrated that 
the plan activation effect could be reliably obtained under conditions of high 
cognitive load, implying that the activation of implementation intentions’ 
components upon forming an if-then plan is due to an automatic process that 
does not require cognitive resources.  
Together, the experiments demonstrate the following cognitive features of 
the mental representation of the anticipated situation and the goal-directed 
behavior as components of an implementation intention: (1) Both elements are 
cognitively represented as knowledge structures; (2) the formation of an 
implementation intention (i.e., linking the situation and the goal-directed 
behavior in an if-then format) enhances the co-activation of both components, 
thereby demonstrating a plan activation effect; (3) the heightened accessibility of 
implementation intentions’ components is a result of (a) an automatic process 
due to their superior status, and (b) a functional relation between the 
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components due to having been linked in an if-then format. The originality of 
these findings reside in the fact that they provide initial insights into the most 
basic processes by which implementation intentions promote goal attainment.  
Planning via Implementation Intentions versus Mental Simulations 
If implementation intentions and mental simulations both represent 
effective planning techniques that foster goal attainment, when is it advisable to 
use one or the other? Do both strategies lead to the same outcome (i.e., reaching 
one’s goals) and are therefore interchangeable depending on, for example, a 
person’s random or personal preference? Or does the effectiveness of each 
planning strategy vary depending on the respective circumstances (e.g., 
temporal) after having set a goal? Based on the differences we found in 
information processing (i.e., closed- versus open-mindedness) between if-then 
plans and mental simulations, we assume the latter. A deliberative mindset might 
be beneficial at the very beginning of planning goal-directed actions as it allows 
exploring best ways of how to achieve a desired goal. Once a decision on the best 
path towards a goal is made, the planning of goal-directed actions benefits from 
thoughts about when, where, and how to achieve the goal, as inherent in an 
implemental mindset. In other words: in the preactional phase individuals might 
benefit from a deliberative mindset at the onset of planning goal-directed actions 
and an implemental mindset in a second step of finalizing specific plans.  
Imagine that you adopted the goal to lead a healthy lifestyle and so far 
have not paid a lot of attention to your health. When trying to achieve this goal, 
you would initially benefit from a deliberative mindset that allows you to imagine 
possible options on how to go about (e.g., exercise more, eat more vegetables, 
drink more water, get more sleep). Therefore, mentally simulating different steps 
of goal attainment would give you a good idea of what means are available and 
most likely beneficial to you (e.g., your engagements might not allow you to get 
more sleep, but you could easily exercise more). Once you are clear on your 
options on how to achieve your goal, your planning process would then benefit 
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from an implemental mindset, as it would enable you to focus and decide on how 
to exactly implement your plan (i.e., exercise more by taking the stairs instead of 
the elevator or going to your gym more often). Hence, you can now further 
ensure goal achievement by forming an implementation intention, that is, by 
linking an anticipated suitable situation with an identified response in an if-then 
format (e.g. “If I find myself standing in front of an elevator, then I will choose to 
walk up the stairs”). Taken together, we suggest that mental simulation and 
implementation intentions benefit the process of goal striving at different points 
in time and should therefore be employed accordingly. However, further research 
is needed to systemically investigate this assumption.  
In conclusion, this chapter highlights insights into motivational phenomena 
(i.e., goals and their means) that follow from a cognitive perspective on 
motivation (Gollwitzer & Baregh, 1994; Kruglanski, 1996; Shah & Kruglanski, 
2000; Shah et al., 2002). Investigating the cognitive processes (i.e., mindsets 
and activation of mental representations) triggered by implementation intentions 
and mental simulations allows understanding how these two self-regulation 
techniques promote goal attainment. The findings afford new empirical and 
theoretical insights into the current understanding of (a) the beneficial effects of 
planning on goal striving in general, and of (b) the functioning of implementation 
intentions in particular. Besides the primary significance of the present research 
to understanding the functioning of implementation intentions and mental 
simulation, it has vast implications for the understanding of goal setting and goal 
implementation in general. 
 
 99 
References 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 50, 179-211. 
Amor, D. A., & Taylor, S. E. (2003). The effects of mindset on behavior: Self-
regulation in deliberative and implemental frames of mind. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 86-95.  
Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Atkinson, J. W. (1957). Motivational determinants of risk taking behavior. 
Psychological Review, 64, 359-372. 
Austin, J. T., & Vancouver, J. B. (1996). Goal constructs in psychology: Structure, 
process, and content. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 338-375. 
Bandura, A. (1991). Self-regulation of motivation through anticipatory and self-
reactive mechanisms. In R. A. Dienstbier (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on 
motivation: Perspectives on motivation (Vol. 38, pp. 69-164). Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Bargh, J. A. (1992). The ecology of automaticity: Towards establishing the 
conditions needed to produce automatic processing effects. American 
Journal of Psychology, 105, 181-199.  
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, efficiency, 
intention, and control in social interaction. In R. S. Wyer, Jr., & T. K.Srull 
(Eds.). Handbook of social cognition (2nd ed., pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Bargh, J. A. (1996). Principles of automaticity. In E. T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski 
(Eds.),  
Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 169-183). New York: 
Guilford Press.  
Bargh, J. A. (1997). The automaticity of everyday life. In R. S. Wyer Jr. (Ed.), 
The automaticity of everyday life: Advances in social cognition (Vol. 10, 
pp. 1- 61). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. 
American Psychologist, 54, 462-479. 
Bayer, U. C., Achtziger, A., Malzacher, U., Moskowitz, G. B., & Gollwitzer, P. M. 
(2007). Implementation intentions and action initiation without conscious 
intent. Manuscript under review. 
Brandstätter, V., Lengfelder, A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2001). Implementation 
intentions and efficient action initiation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 946-960. 
 
 100 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. 
Cambridge, UK: University Press. 
Escalas, J. E., & Luce, M. F. (2003). Process versus outcome thought-focus and 
advertising. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13, 246-54.   
Escalas, J. E., & Luce, M. F. (2004). Understanding the effects of process-focused 
versus outcome-focused thought in response to advertising. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 31, 274-285. 
Faude, T. S. (2005). The mental representation of plans. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Konstanz, Germany. 
Fujita, K., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Oettingen, G. (2007). Mindsets and pre-conscious 
open-mindedness to incidental information. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 43, 48-61.  
Gagne, F. M., & Lydon, J. E. (2001). Mind-set and close relationships: When bias 
leads to (in)accurate predictions. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 85-96.  
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mindsets. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. 
 Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of 
social  behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 51-92). New York: Guilford Press. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1993). Goal achievement: The role of intentions. In W. Stroebe 
& M. Hewstone (Eds.), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 
141-185). New York: Wiley. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1996). The volititonal benefits of planning. In P. M. Gollwitzer & 
J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition and 
motivation to behavior (pp. 287-312). New York: Guilford Press. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple 
plans. American Psychologist, 54, 493-503. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (1996). The psychology of action: Linking 
cognition and motivation to behavior. New York: Guilford Press. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bayer, U. C. (1999). Deliberative and implemental mind-sets 
in the control of action. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process 
theories in social psychology (pp. 403-422). New York: Guilford Press. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Brandstätter, V. (1997). Implementation intentions and 
effective goal pursuit. Journal of personality and Social Psychology, 73, 
186-199. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., Fujita, K., & Oettingen, G. (2004). Planning and the 
implementation of goals. In R. Baumeister & K. Vohs (Eds.), Handbook of 
self-regulation research (pp. 211-228). New York: Guilford Press.  
 
 101 
Gollwitzer, P. M., Heckhausen, H., & Steller, B. (1990). Deliberative and 
implemental mind-sets: Cognitive tuning toward congruous thoughts and 
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1119-1127.  
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Kinney, R. F. (1989). Effects of deliberative and implemental 
mind-sets on illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 56, 531-542. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996). Goal effects on action and cognition. 
In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of 
basic principles (pp. 361-399). New York: Guilford Press. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Schaal, B. (1998). Metacognition in action: The importance of 
implementation intentions. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 
124-136.  
Gollwitzer, P. M. & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal 
achievement: A meta-analysis of effects and processes. Advances of 
Experimental Social Psychology. 38, 69-119. 
Greitemeyer, T., & Würz, D. (2006). Mental simulation and the achievement of 
health goals: The role of goal difficulty. Imagination, Cognition, and 
Personality, 25, 239-251. 
Heckhausen, H. (1991). Motivation and action. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Heckhausen, H., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1987). Thought contents and cognitive 
functioning in motivational versus volitional states of mind. Motivation and 
Emotion, 11, 101-120. 
Hirt, E. R., & Markmann, K. D. (1995). Multiple explanations: A consider-an-
alternative strategy for debiasing judgments. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 36, 384-409.  
Hirt, E. R., Kardes, F. R., & Markmann, K. D. (2004). Activating a mental 
simulation mind-set through generation of alternatives: Implications for 
debiasing in related and unrelated domains. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 40, 374-383.  
Kahnemann, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. 
Kahnemann, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases (pp. 201-208). Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kruglanski, A.W, Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, A., Young Chun, W., & 
Sleeth-Keppler, D. (2002). A theory of goal-systems. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 331-378. 
Kuhl, J. (1984). Volitional aspects of achievement motivation and learned 
helplessness: Toward a comprehensive theory of action control. In B. A. 
 
 102 
Maher (Ed.), Progress in experimental personality research (Vol. 13, pp. 
99-171). New York: Academic Press.  
Lengfelder, A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2001). Reflective and reflexive action control 
in patients with frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychology, 15, 80-100. 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). A theory of goal setting and task 
performance. 
  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Logan, G. D. (1992). Attention and preattention in theories of automaticity. 
American Journal of Psychology, 105, 317-339. 
Marsh, R. L., & Landau, J. D. (1995). Item availability in cryptomnesia: Assessing 
its role in two paradigms of unconscious plagiarism. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 1568-
1582.  
Milne, S, Orbell, S., & Sheeran, P. (2002). Combining motivational and volitional 
interventions to promote exercise participation: Protection motivation 
theory and implementation intentions. British Journal of Health 
Psychology, 7, 163-184. 
Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual 
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 297-326.  
Oettingen, G., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2001). Goal setting and goal striving. In A. 
Tesser & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Blackwell handbook in social psychology: 
Intraindividual processes (Vol. 1, pp. 329-347). Oxford, England: 
Blackwell.  
Orbell, S., Hodgkins, S., & Sheeran, P. (1997). Implementation intentions and the 
theory of planned behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 
945-954. 
Orbell, S., & Sheeran, P. (1998). “Inclined abstainers”: A problem for predicting 
health-related behavior. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 151-165. 
Park, D. C., Hertzog, C., Kidder, D. P., Morrell, R. W.,  & Mayhorn, C. B. (1997). 
Effect of age on event-based and time-based prospective memory. 
Psychology and Aging, 12, 314-327. 
Pham, L. P., & Taylor, S. E. (1999). From thought to action: Effects of process-
versus outcome-based mental simulations on performance. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 250-260. 
Phillips, D. M., & Baumgartner, H. (2002). The role of consumption emotions in 
the satisfaction response. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13, 243-252. 
 
 103 
Puca, R. M., & Schmalt, H. D. (2001). The influence of the achievement motive on 
spontaneous thoughts in pre and post-decisional action phases. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 302-308.  
Ratcliff, R., & McKoon, G. (1978). Priming in item recognition: Evidence for the 
propositional structure of sentences. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal 
Behavior, 17, 403-417. 
Rivkin, I. A., & Taylor, S. E. (1999). The effects of mental simulation on coping 
with controllable stressful events. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 25, 1451-1462. 
Shah, J., & Kruglanski, A. (2000). Aspects of goal networks: Implications for self-
regulation. In M. Boekaerts, P. Pintrich, & M. Zeidner (Eds.), Handbook of 
self-regulation (pp. 85-110). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Friedman, A. (2003). Goal systems theory: 
Integrating the cognitive and motivation aspects of self-regulation. In S. 
Spencer, S. Fein, M. Zanna, & J. Olson (Eds.). Motivated social perception: 
The Ontario symposium (pp. 247-275). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention-behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical 
review. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social 
psychology (Vol. 112, pp. 1-36). Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Sheeran, P., & Orbell, S. (1999). Implementation intentions and repeated 
behavior: augmenting the predictive validity of the theory of planned 
behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 349-369.  
Sheeran, P., & Orbell, S. (2000). Using implementation intentions to increase 
attendance for cervical cancer screening. Health Psychology, 19, 283-289. 
Sheeran, P., Webb, T. L., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2005). The interplay between goal 
intentions and implementation intentions. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 31, 87-98. 
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human 
information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a 
general theory. Psychological Review, 84, 127-190. 
Sorrentino, R. M., & Higgins, E. T. (1986). Handbook of motivation and cognition 
(Vol. 1): Foundations of social behavior. New York: Guilford Press.  
Taylor, S. E., Shelley, E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects of mindset on 
positive illusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 69, 213-
226.  
Taylor, S. E., & Pham, L. B. (1999). The Effect of Mental Simulation on Goal-
Directed Performance. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 18, 253-
268. 
 
 104 
Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., & Armor, D.A. (1998). Harnessing the 
imagination: Mental simulation, self-regulation, and coping. American 
Psychologist, 53, 429-439.  
Taylor, S. E., & Schneider, S. K. (1989). Coping and the simulation of events. 
Social Cognition, 7, 174-194. 
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral intentions engender 
behavior change? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. 
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 249-268. 
Würz, D., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Greitemeyer, T. (2007). Mental simulation and 
implementation intentions: Initiating different mind-sets. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
DANIELA WÜRZ 
 
Geboren: 15. November 1973 in Karlsruhe 
Status: Single 
 
BERUFSERFAHRUNG 
 
03/2006 – 
heute 
Contingency Planning Officer – United Nations  
UN Headquarters, New York City, USA 
  
02/2002 – 
12/2002 
Studentusche Hilfskraft – Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung (MPI)   
Berlin, Deutschland 
 
  
08/2001 – 
01/2002 
Studnetische Hilfskraft – Gesell. für Innovationsforschungs und Beratung (GIB)    
Berlin, Deutschland  
 
  
02/2000 –  
09/2000 
Praktikant – DaimlerChrysler Services (DEBIS)  
Human Resources and Communication Department– Berlin, Deutschland 
  
 
AUSBILDUNG 
 
09/2004 – 
present 
New York University (NYU) – USA 
Department der Sozialpsychologie – Merit (ERP Graduiertenstipendium) 
• Dissertation: “The use of mental simulation and implementation intentions on the 
achievement of health-related goals”. 
  
01/2003 – 
present 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München – Deutschland 
Department of Social Psychology– Doctoral student  
• Dissertation: “The use of mental simulation and implementation intentions on the 
achievement of health-related goals”. 
• Promotionsstipendiat der Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes 
  
04/1997 –  
09/2002 
Freie Universität Berlin – Deutschland 
Diplom Psychologie – Note Sehr Gut  
• Diplomarbeit: “Mental simulation and the achievement of health-related goals”.  
• Studienschwerpunkte: Motivation, Gesundheitspsychologie, Organisationspsychologie 
• Auslandsstudium 2000/01: University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) – USA 
 
AUSZEICHNUNGEN 
 
2004 - 06 ERP Stipendium des Deutschen Ministeriums für Wirtschaft und Arbeit und der 
Studienstiftung 
2004 - 06 Promotionsstipendium der Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes 
2003 Promotionsstipendium des Cusanuswerk  
2003 Special Student Fellowship, University of California Los Angeles 
 
 
